The Unity of Aristotle’s Metaphysics: Book Ε According to the Interpretation of the Ancient Commentators by Salis, Rita
 The Unity of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 
Book Ε according to the Interpretation of the Ancient Commentators 
 
 
               Rita Salis 
                                                                        
This paper discusses the three ancient commentaries on Book E of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, that have 
been handed down to us. It aims to demonstrate the fundamental part played by their particular 
interpretation of Aristotle’s doctrines in the birth of the traditional interpretation of his Metaphysics, 
according to which all the books comprising the work were written as a function of Book Λ, 
containing the well-known doctrine of the unmoved mover.  Among the main elements supporting 
this assumption there is Aristotle’s distinction between three types of science - the theoretical, the 
practical and the productive - and his claiming the primacy of metaphysics as a theological science. 
According to the ancient commentators, the remainder of Book E would belong to the unitary project 
of the Metaphysics, since it would indicate what is not encompassed in the object of metaphysics. 
This would mean that Aristotle’s treatment of accidental being, being as truth and not-being as falsity, 
and being potentially and actually would take on a negative function. The theological interpretation of 








This paper aims to demonstrate that one of the essential foundations for the 
theologizing interpretation of Aristotle’s metaphysics that characterizes the whole tradition of 
the ancient commentaries, according to which all the books in the Metaphysics would be 
steps along a path towards the divine substance (a topic developed, as we know, in the second 
part of Book Λ), lies in the ancient commentators’ interpretation of Book Ε. The ancient 
commentaries on Book Ε that have been handed down to us were written by Asclepius1, 
pseudo-Alexander2, and pseudo-Philoponus.3 Asclepius’s commentary only covers Books A-
1 Cf. Asclepii In Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libros Α-Ζ commentaria (CAG 6.2), edidit Michael 
Hayduck, Berolini 1888. 
2 Alexandri Aphrodisiensis In Aristotelis Metaphysica commentaria (CAG 1), edidit Michael 
Hayduck, Berolini 1891. 
3 Pseudo-Johannis Philoponi Expositiones in Omnes Ζ Aristotelis Libros Metaphysicos (CAGL 2), 
Übersetzt Franciscus Patritius, Neudruck der ersten Ausgabe Ferrara 1583 mit einer Einleitung von 
Charles Lohr (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1991).  
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Z. It echoes the oral teachings of Ammonius, head of the Neoplatonic school of Alexandria, 
and draws on the commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics by Alexander of Aphrodisias.4 The 
commentary by pseudo-Philoponus (wrongly attributed to John Philoponus) has only reached 
us in the Latin version. The author quotes a passage from pseudo-Alexander’s commentary 
on Book E, attributing it to Michael of Ephesus5 - and this becomes the most important clue 
to the non-authenticity of the latter commentary.6 Pseudo-Alexander’s work is distinctive for 
its breadth and its particular place in the history of the Aristotelian tradition: his commentary 
on Book Ε was the first of the commentaries on the books of the Metaphysics to be attributed 
for centuries to Alexander of Aphrodisias (the greatest of the ancient commentators on 
Aristotle), and subsequently acknowledged as inauthentic. Although most manuscripts 
attribute the whole work to Alexander, in manuscript A (Parisinus graecus 1876, 13th 
century) somebody placed the name of the byzantine Michael of Ephesus (11th-12th centuries) 
before the title of the commentary on Book Ε.7 That the commentary on Books Ε-Ν handed 
down to us is not the authentic commentary by Alexander is confirmed by the fact that 
Asclepius’s commentary on Book Ζ includes three quotations from Alexander that are 
nowhere to be found in the commentary on the same book which came down to us.8 We can 
also find many passages in the Syrianus’s commentary on Books Μ and Ν that are the same 
as those appearing in the inauthentic commentary: this means that, if Syrianus were to have 
relied on pseudo-Alexander as a source, then it is impossible to identify the latter with 
Michael of Ephesus. Robert W. Sharples demonstrated, however, that pseudo-Alexander is 
4 Asclepius, In Metaph., pp. 167, 35-168, 18 = Alexander, In Metaph., pp. 196, 31-197, 21; Asclepius, 
In Metaph., p. 169, 1-11 = Alexander, In Metaph., p. 198, 1-11; Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 170, 3-16 = 
Alexander, In Metaph., p. 198, 16-30.  
5 Cf. pseudo-Philoponus, In Metaph., p. 25 r: “Ephesius autem proprie entia dicit, singulares 
substantias, et recte” = pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 458, 5-6:  κυρίως ὄντα λέγων τὰς  ἀτόμους 
οὐσίας.  
6 Cf. Paul Moraux, Alexandre d’Aphrodise, exégète de la Noétique d’Aristote, (Liège, Faculté de 
philosophie et lettres and Paris, Droz 1942), p. 15; Sten Ebbesen, Commentators and Commentaires 
on Aristotle’s Sophistici Elenchi: A Study of Post-Aristotelian Ancient and Medieval Writings on 
Fallacies, vol. III, Appendix 8 (Leiden, Brill 1981), p. 87; Stefan Alexandru, A New Manuscript of 
Pseudo-Philoponus’ Commentary on Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’ Containing a Hitherto Unknown 
Ascription of the Work, «Phronesis», 44 (1999), pp. 374-352, spec. p. 348.  
7 Cf. Hermann Bonitz, Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis Metaphysica commentaria, edidit 
Hermann Bonitz, (Berolini, Reimer 1847), Prefatio, p. XIV. 
8 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., pp. 408, 5-7; 408, 20 ff.; 428, 13 ff. Cf. Concetta Luna, Trois études sur 
la tradition des commentaires anciens à la Métaphysique d’Aristote, (Leiden-Boston-Köln, Brill 
2001), p. 51 note 90. 
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more likely to have relied on Syrianus.9 In the 16th century, Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda - the 
author of the Latin version of the Alexander’s and pseudo-Alexander’s commentary on 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics10 - rejected the opinion prevailing in his time that tended to identify 
pseudo-Alexander with Michael of Ephesus. He claimed that the author of the second part of 
the commentary was Alexander himself.11 Hermann Bonitz was of the same opinion, but he 
also held that the two parts of the work differed in style and content, and had come to us in a 
revised form, modified by a lesser author living after Alexander.12 
Jacob Freudenthal was another to reject the idea that pseudo-Alexander was the 
Christian Michael. One reason for his conviction was the fact that numerous references to 
polytheism appeared in the commentary on Books Ε-Ν, and he accused pseudo-Alexander of 
being a forger, an imposter deliberately pretending to be the real Alexander. According to 
Freudenthal, pseudo-Alexander was a Neoplatonic living between the 5th and 6th centuries.13 
Freudenthal’s theory regarding the identification of pseudo-Alexander with a Neoplatonic 
was taken up by Leonardo Tarán, who nevertheless claimed that Syrianus had made use of 
9 In fact, Sharples demonstrated that Simplicius’s comment on Aristotle, De caelo II 12 corresponds 
word for word to pseudo-Alexander’s comment on Aristotle, Metaph. Λ 8, 1074 a 13-14. But 
Simplicius’s commentary contains a broader version of the text, and Sharples noted that the parts 
contained in Simplicius but not in pseudo-Alexander would support the reliance of pseudo-Alexander 
on Simplicius. Since Simplicius came after Syrianus, it follows that pseudo-Alexander also relied on 
Syrianus. Cf. Robert William Sharples, Pseudo-Alexander on Aristotle, Metaphysics Λ, in Giancarlo 
Movia (a cura), Alessandro di Afrodisia e la “Metafisica” di Aristotele, (Milano, Vita e Pensiero 
2003), pp. 187-218. I discussed the question of pseudo-Alexander’s identity in Rita Salis, Il commento 
di pseudo-Alessandro al libro Λ della Metafisica di Aristotele (Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino 2005), 
pp. 23-28; 371-374. 
10 Cf. Alexandri Aphrodisei Commentaria In duodecim Aristotelis libros de prima Philosophia, 
interprete Ioannes Genesius Sepulveda (Pariis 1536). 
11 Among the reasons mentioned by Sepulveda to support this theory there was the fact that most of 
the ancient manuscripts attributed the whole commentary to Alexander, and the observation that there 
would be no difference in style between the two parts of the commentary. This opinion was refuted 
by: Francesco Patrizi, who suggested that the author of the commentary on Books E-N was Alexander 
Aegeus (cf. Discussionum Peripateticarum, T. IV (Basel 1581), pp. 32-33); Brandis, who attributed 
the second part of the work to Michael of Ephesus or a later author (cf. Christian August Brandis, 
Scholia in Aristotelem, 734 a, in Aristotelis Opera, edidit Academia Regia Borussica, vol. IV, 
(Berolini 1836)); and Ravaisson, who identified pseudo-Alexander with Michael of Ephesus (cf. Félix 
Ravaisson, Essai sur la Metaphysique d’Aristote, vol. I, (Hildesheim, Olms 1963), pp. 64-65). Cf. 
also Luna, Trois études, p. 55 note 108.   
12 Bonitz, Metaph., Praefatio, pp. XIV-XXVII. 
13 Cf. Jacob Freudenthal, Die durch Averroes erhaltenen Fragmente Alexanders zur Metaphysik des 
Aristoteles untersucht und übersetzt, «Abhandlungen der königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften 
zu Berlin», Berlin 1884, phil. hist. Kl., no. 1, pp. 19 ff.; 27 ff.; 32-33; 53-54. 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy 
ISSN 1981-9471 - FFLCH/USP 
www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga
J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.12, n.1. p. 89-132, 2018. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v12i2p89-132 
91
pseudo-Alexander’s work, mistaking it for the authentic commentary14, and that Simplicius 
had done so too.15 On the other hand, Karl Praechter supported the identification of pseudo-
Alexander with Michael, explaining the references to polytheism in the second part of the 
commentary with the claim that, in Michael’s time, philosophy was separate from religion.16 
Paul Moraux was of the same opinion and, unlike Freudenthal and Tarán, he believed that 
neither pseudo-Alexander nor Syrianus had made use of each other’s commentaries, but that 
both had drawn on the same source, i.e. the authentic commentary of Alexander.17 Sharples 
justifies Freudenthal’s observation that a Christian would have been unable to do what 
pseudo-Alexander did when, commenting on the final passage of Metaph. Λ, in which 
Aristotle declares the supremacy of a first principle, he concludes by saying that divinities are 
the causes of the wandering stars, even though they depend for their participation and will on 
the first and most blessed intelligence.18 According to Sharples, pseudo-Alexander may have 
meant to clarify the condition of the subordinate unmoved movers, or else this passage might 
have been included in the commentary from a pagan source.19 Finally, Concetta Luna showed 
that pseudo-Alexander is actually Michael of Ephesus on the grounds of precise textual 
comparisons. Among the reasons she advanced, one concerns the repeated use of terms and 
expressions that can only be found in works attributed to pseudo-Alexander and to Michael.20 
To further support the identification of pseudo-Alexander with Michael, we might add that 
Freudenthal’s theory that pseudo-Alexander actually wanted to appear as the real Alexander 
is hard to defend because in antiquity the idea of presenting a spurious work as authentic had 
yet to be conceived.21 The references to polytheism contained in the last passage of pseudo-
Alexander’s commentary could be seen as reflecting the Greek conception of the divine.22  
14 Cf. Leonardo Tarán, Syrianus and pseudo-Alexander’s commentary on Metaph. E-N, in Paul 
Moraux, Aristoteles Werk und Wirkung, Bd. 2: Kommentierung, Überlieferung, Nachleben, (Berlin, 
De Gruyter 1987), pp. 215-232, spec. pp. 223 ff. 
15 Cf. Tarán, Syrianus, p. 230 and note 42. 
16 Cf. Karl Praechter, review on CAG ΧΧΙΙ, 2, in «Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen», 11, 1906, pp. 
882-899, spec. pp. 882-896. 
17 Paul Moraux, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias, 
Bd. 3: Alexander von Aphrodisias, herausgegeben Jürgen Wiesner, (Berlin-New York, De Gruyter 
2001), pp. 423 ff.; Moraux, Alexandre d’Aphrodise, pp. 14-19.   
18 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 721, 32-33. 
19 Cf. Sharples, Pseudo-Alexander on Aristotle, p. 191. 
20 Per es. μεμελανωμένως (cf. Luna, Trois études, p. 35 and note 62).  
21 Cf. Sharples, Pseudo-Alexander on Aristotle, pp. 191-192 and note 27. 
22 This is what I claimed in Il commento di pseudo-Alessandro, p. 28.  
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 1. The distinction between the sciences and theological science  
 
For the ancient commentators, acknowledging the unity of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 
posed the serious problem of having to justify steps along the metaphysical path that were 
clearly not directly pertinent to the development of the science being investigated. The case 
of Book E is particularly emblematic because the first chapter discusses theological science 
and claims its primacy over the other sciences, but then the other three chapters are clearly 
dedicated to different topics from first philosophy, making it difficult for the ancient 
commentators to explain their role. Asclepius’s commentary on Metaph. Ε begins with 
several significant general considerations on the topic of the book. The commentator 
explicitly states that Aristotle’s aim was to deal with accidental being, being as truth and not-
being as falsity, and being potentially and actually in order to demonstrate that first 
philosophy, the object of which is all beings qua beings, must only focus on being per se in 
each category. Asclepius goes on to say that the first philosopher will not be concerned with 
accidental being because this is indeterminate, nor will he consider being as truth and not-
being as falsity, even though it is determinate, because he will only be interested in being ‘in 
general’ (ἁπλῶς), that is the simplest being (ἁπλουστάτου). Truth and falsity will concern 
combination and separation. First philosophy will not be concerned with being potentially 
and actually either, as it will focus on being per se. In Book Ε, Aristotle will only concern 
himself with demonstrating that philosophy can be divided into theoretical and practical 
sciences, since philosophy cannot be a productive science because its purpose is to gain 
knowledge.23 So, according to Asclepius, the purpose of Book E, in discussing the four 
principal meanings of being, would be to demonstrate that first philosophy cannot be 
concerned with accidental being, or with being as truth and not-being as falsity, nor even – 
adds the commentator, going a step beyond Aristotle – with being potentially and actually. It 
can only focus on the absolutely simplest being, i.e. on the being according to the figures of 
the categories. Book E would thus acquire a negative function within the Metaphysics, since 
Aristotle would use it to show which meanings of being should not be the object of study by 
the first philosopher.  
    Pseudo-Philoponus tries to solve the problem concerning the topic of Book E by claiming 
that the science of being qua being is only sketched out here, to be further developed in 
23 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., pp. 358, 4-359, 16. 
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subsequent books in the Metaphysics. It is important to mention that some lines from pseudo-
Philoponus’s commentary coincide almost word for word with parts of pseudo-Alexander’s 
text.24 As mentioned earlier, and as we shall see later on, that a relationship existed between 
the two commentaries is also demonstrated by pseudo-Philoponus’s reference to the man 
from Ephesus (meaning Michael of Ephesus) on the matter of a passage in Ε 4.25 This goes to 
show that it was pseudo-Philoponus who drew on pseudo-Alexander’s work, and supports the 
conviction that pseudo-Alexander and Michael of Ephesus were one and the same. 
        In the brief prologue to his work on Metaph. Ε, pseudo-Alexander seems to come closer 
to pseudo-Philoponus than to Asclepius. In fact, pseudo-Alexander recalls Aristotle’s 
definition of the object of first philosophy as a science that focuses on being qua being, in 
Book  Γ.26 But in the incipit of Metaph. Ε 1, this definition is combined with the definition of 
first philosophy as a science of causes and principles.27 A little later on, Aristotle 
distinguishes the special sciences from the science of being qua being, saying that the former 
are concerned with a certain genus of being, while the latter deals with being simply and qua 
being.28 Anticipating the passage in Aristotle, pseudo-Alexander uses the example of 
astronomy, which he says focuses not on the nature of beings, but on their properties. In the 
incipit of his commentary, the topic of Book E is thus brought down to the science which we 
are seeking, in an attempt to save the unitary conception of the Metaphysics as a whole.  
Pseudo-Alexander is nonetheless obliged to acknowledge that the science of being qua being 
is not very clearly presented in Book E, and he refers the reader to Book Z for a less obscure 
explanation, and to subsequent books for an in-depth treatment of the concept.29 In the last 
24 Cf. pseudo-Philoponus, In Metaph., p. 24 r: Illam dicens scire ens ut ens, quae cuiusque 
definitionem novit. Sive intelligibile illud sit, siv.e aliud quippiam et quorum sunt definitiones, et 
quorum non sunt = Pseudo Alexander, In Metaph., p. 440, 10-14: ἐκείνην λέγει τὴν ἐπιστήμην εἰδέναι 
 τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν τὴν  ἑκάστου ὁρισμὸν εἰδυῖαν καὶ ὅπως ἕκαστον ὁρίζεσθαι προσήκει διορίζουσαν, εἴτε  
νοητὸν εἴτε ἄλλο τι, καὶ τίνων μέν  εἰσιν ὁρισμοὶ τίνων δὲ οὔκ εἰσιν. 
25 Cf. infra, § 4. 
26 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 440, 3-4. 
27 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 1, 1025 b 1-2. Cf. Giancarlo Movia, Introduzione a Giancarlo Movia (ed.), 
Alessandro di Afrodisia e pseudo-Alessandro, Commentario alla “Metafisica” di Aristotele (Milano, 
Bompiani 2007), p. LXXIX.   
28 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 1, 1025 b 7-10. Cf. Movia, Introduzione, p. LXXIX. 
29 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 440, 6-10. Pseudo-Alexander rightly points out that Book E 
does not contain a complete discussion of the science of being qua being. In fact, this is the science of 
the primary meanings of being, and it had been established in Metaph. Γ that they are several, and 
converge in their principal meaning, i.e. in the substance. In Metaph. Δ 7 it is also stated that there are 
four such meanings: accidental being, being per se, being as truth and not-being as falsity, and being 
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part of his prologue, pseudo-Alexander claims that, according to Aristotle, the science of 
being qua being knows the definition of each entity, and establishes which entities have a 
definition and which do not.30 Movia suggests that, on the strength of Metaph. Z 4-6, the 
commentator probably intends to remind us that it is up to ontology to ascertain what has a 
definition, that is to identify the substance in the strict sense and, in a derivative way, the 
accidents.31 In fact, pseudo-Alexander seems to anticipate the content of the subsequent book, 
as if to make up for a shortcoming in Book E.       
       Aristotle’s claim that every science which is ratiocinative or that involves reasoning 
deals with more or less precise causes and principles is exemplified by health and good 
condition on the one hand, and by mathematics on the other.32 Pseudo-Alexander faithfully 
provides the same examples33, while for the sciences that are ratiocinative the commentator 
speaks of the practical sciences.34 As an example of sciences of which the principles are more 
precise, pseudo-Alexander mentions geometry, while he suggests astronomy and medicine as 
sciences of which the principles are less exact.35 The same examples (geometry and 
astronomy) appear in pseudo-Philoponus.36 Regarding the superiority of the principles of 
geometry, pseudo-Alexander had previously referred to the beginning of the De anima37, 
where - according to Movia - Aristotle probably wants to say that psychology is superior to 
the other special sciences both because of its strict method, and because of the value of the 
object it studies.38 Asclepius describes the theoretical sciences as those relying on reasoning 
potentially and actually. Only two of these meanings of being are discussed in Book Ε (accidental 
being and being as truth), while it is in Book Z that Aristotle shows that the being par excellence is 
that of the first category, substance. He concerns himself with first substance in Book Λ, while he 
deals with being potentially and actually in book Θ. Cf. Movia, Introduzione, p. LXXX. 
30 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 440, 10-13. 
31 Cf. Movia, Introduzione, p. LXXX.  
32 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 1, 1025 b 2-3. 
33 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 441, 1-2. 
34 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 441, 4. On this issue, Movia believes it more likely that 
Aristotle was referring to the sciences that are based on experience rather than on reasoning. Cf. 
Movia, Introduzione, p. LXXXI and note 9; cf. William David Ross, Aristotle’s Metaphysics. A 
Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary, vol. Ι (Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press 
for Sandpiper Books 1997), p. 351. 
35 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 441, 33-35. 
36 Cf. pseudo-Philoponus, In Metaph., p. 24 r. 
37 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 441, 8-9. 
38 Cf. Aristotle, De an. I 1, 402 a 1-4. Cf. Movia, Introduzione, p. LXXXI and note 10, where it is also 
rightly mentioned that, while Aristotle does not compare explicitly geometry with astronomy in 
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(λόγῳ) alone, and he refers to geometry. Among the sciences in which reasoning somehow 
plays a part, he mentions those that make use of reason and of a function (ἔργον), that is of 
sensation, such as harmonic science (which is reliant on hearing). Anticipating what Aristotle 
claims in 1025 b 11-12, Asclepius explains that these sciences may be more strictly 
concerned with principles (relying exclusively on reason), or less so (relying on sensation and 
reason). As examples of sciences that deal with a part of being, the commentator mentions: 
medicine, which is concerned with the human body; astronomy, which focuses on the 
celestial bodies; and geometry, which deals with quantities.39 In pseudo-Philoponus’s 
commentary, the difference between the sciences that make a more or less strict use of 
reasoning is described in the same terms as in Asclepius, thus anticipating 1025 b 11-12. In 
fact, pseudo-Philoponus says that the special sciences are not concerned with the essence, but 
they assume it with sensation or supposition.40  
Aristotle goes on to provide three reasons for the difference between first philosophy 
and the special sciences. As anticipated above, the first is that the special sciences have as 
their object only some particular being, whereas first philosophy investigates being simply 
(ἁπλῶς)  and qua being.41 Pseudo-Alexander explains that the special sciences study the 
causes of a given object, that is secondary causes, while first philosophy studies the causes of 
being in the absolute sense, qua being, or primary causes.42 The second reason is that instead 
of offering any discussion of the essence, the special sciences start from it (clarifying it and 
indicating it43 as sensation, others assuming it hypothetically), and they more or less precisely 
demonstrate the properties that belong per se to the genus they are discussing.44 As examples 
of the first class of sciences, pseudo-Alexander mentions medicine and physics, and he 
specifies that it is up to the latter to demonstrate the principles of the former.45 He includes 
Metaph. Ε 1, the superiority of the principles of geometry emerges from Metaph. M 3, 1078 a 9-13, 
where it is claimed that the degree of preciseness of a science is proportional to the simplicity and 
preciseness of its object. 
39 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 359, 15-20. 
40 Cf. pseudo-Philoponus, In Metaph., p. 24 r. 
41 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 1, 1025 b 8-10. 
42 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 441, 10-14; Movia, Introduzione, p. LXXXI. 
43 Cf. Christopher Kirwan, Aristotle, Metaphysics Books Gamma, Delta, and Epsilon, transl. with 
notes, (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1971, 19932, repr. 1998), p. 66. 
44 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 1, 1025 b 10-13. 
45 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 441, 16-24; Movia, Introduzione, pp. LXXXI-LXXXII and 
note 14, which refers to Aristotle, De an. I 1, 403 b 9-16; De sensu 1, 436 a 17-b 1; De Resp. 27, 480 
b 22-30.  
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mathematics in the second class of sciences, saying that arithmetic hypothesizes that unity is 
substance without position.46 Both pseudo-Alexander and Asclepius rightly refer to the 
Posterior Analytics47, and they both explain that, according to Aristotle, sciences cannot 
demonstrate their principles.48 Pseudo-Alexander clarifies that each special science 
demonstrates the affections of its object, and of what pertains thereto.49 So, Aristotle sees 
neither the physical sciences nor the mathematical sciences as being concerned with the 
essence: the former assume it from sensation, the latter hypothetically, and both demonstrate 
that the attributes necessarily belong to their respective subjects by virtue of this assumed 
(but not demonstrated) essence.50 Pseudo-Alexander correctly explains this view, and he 
agrees.51 
Aristotle makes the point that such an induction (ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπαγωγῆς) yields no 
demonstration of either the substance or the essence52, and that there is another type of 
explanation for them.53 Movia considers it feasible that Aristotle might have used the term 
‘induction’ to mean the manner of proceeding of the special sciences, i.e. the assumption of 
the essence starting from a perception or a hypothesis. In both procedures, the special 
sciences assume, but do not demonstrate the essence - something impossible to do, even for 
philosophy. Movia concludes that, for the essence, we therefore need a different type of 
explanation, instead of a demonstration, and this is a task for philosophy, with its problematic 
46 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 441, 24-27. Cf. Aristotle, An. post. I 27, 87 a 36; Ross, 
Metaph., vol. I, p. 352; Movia, Introduzione, p. LXXXII and note 15, where, regarding the principle 
formulated in 441, 27, according to which things which are equal to the same thing are equal to each 
other, reference is made to Euclid’s first axiom. The second definition of the point in 441, 26-27, as of 
that which has no part, corresponds to Euclid, I, def. 1 (cf. The Thirteen Books of Euclid’s Elements 
with Introduction and Commentary by Sir Thomas Little Heath, vol. I (New York, Dover 19562), ad 
loc.). 
47 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 442, 1; Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 359, 28-29: cf. Aristotle, An. 
post. I 3. 
48 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 441, 27-28; Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 359, 27. In 359, 29-32, 
Asclepius refers to the Almagest by Ptolomy, I 3, on the matter of astronomy, included among the 
sciences that infer the definition from sensation. 
49 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 441, 28-31. 
50 Cf. Movia, Introduzione, p. LXXXII. 
51 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 441, 27-38. 
52 Cf. Enrico Berti, Aristote. Métaphysique Livre Epsilon, Introduction, traduction et commentaire 
(Paris, Vrin 2015), p. 89, where it is believed that ‘essence’ and ‘substance’ in 1025 b 14 are 
synonymous.  
53 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 1, 1025 b 14-16. 
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or dialectic (rather than demonstrative) approach.54 Pseudo-Alexander only considers the case 
of the essence being assumed on the basis of sensation, that he associates with induction. The 
commentator emphasizes that a belief obtained by means of sensation and induction is not a 
demonstration. On this issue, he refers readers to the Posterior Analytics55, where Aristotle 
declares that demonstrations are universal, while a given object is perceived here and now. It 
is impossible to perceive the universal because it is neither this given thing, nor is it now.56 
Then induction is set against demonstration: the former proceeds from particulars; the latter 
from universals.57 Pseudo-Alexander objects that somebody might admit of induction not 
being universal and, by virtue of this, he claims that a demonstration of the substance, of the 
essence, and of the definition clearly does not derive from said induction, but by another way, 
that Aristotle will explain in Book Z.58 According to Movia, however, Aristotle might answer 
that induction could not reach a universal conclusion unless all the species (e.g., ‘man, ‘horse, 
‘mule’) of the genus (e.g., ‘animal without bile’) about which we mean to establish a 
universal proposition (e.g., ‘all animals without bile are longaeval’) have been assumed.59 
The fact that pseudo-Alexander declares it impossible to demonstrate the essence seems to 
place him among those commentators who were the first to attribute a non-demonstrative 
function to first philosophy.60 Berti believes, on the other hand, that it is not up to first 
philosophy to clarify the principles of the special sciences: this would go against the 
autonomy of the special sciences claimed in the Posterior Analytics, where it is stated that the 
principles specific to each science are not demonstrable. According to Berti, therefore, the 
other way (ἄλλος τρόπος) to clarify the essence must be dialectic - of which in Top. I 2, 101 b 
2-4 it is said that gives access to the principles of all methods - or the intellect (νοῦς), that in 
An. post. II 19, 100 b 6-12, and in Eth. Nic. VI 6, 1141 a 7-8, is considered the ἕξις, a 
disposition or possession of the principles. The scholar says that the two interpretations could 
come together if we accept that dialectic introduce us to the intellect.61 On the other hand, 
while Aristotle undeniably rules out the possibility of demonstrating the principles (in the 
54 Cf. Movia, Introduzione, p. LXXXII and note 18. 
55 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., pp. 441, 38-442, 1. 
56 Cf. Aristotle, An. post. I 31, 87 b 28-39. Cf. Movia, Introduzione, p. LXXXIII. 
57 Cf. Aristotle, An. post. I 18, 81 a 39-b 1. Cf. Movia, Introduzione, p. LXXXIII. 
58 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 442, 1-5. 
59 Cf. Movia, Introduzione, p. LXXXIII and note 22. 
60 Cf. Movia, Introduzione, p. LXIII.  
61 Cf. Aristotle, An. post. I 3, 72 b 18-25. Cf. Berti, Métaphysique, pp. 89-90. 
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strict sense) - not only for the special sciences, but also for first philosophy – given that the 
principle is intrinsically not demonstrable, the feasibility of intellect or dialectic being the 
other way to clarify the essence remains problematic. We know that the only form of 
demonstration that Aristotle accepts for the principle of non-contradiction, and for the 
principle of excluded middle, is by refutation, as discussed in Metaph. Γ, and only first 
philosophy can provide this particular demonstration. Assigning this task to another science, 
or to another method, raises the difficulty of explaining the whole of Book Γ. Asclepius also 
says clearly that the essence is not demonstrable, and he gives the example of mathematics, 
which does not demonstrate its objects, but it assumes their existence by hypothesis.62 
The last reason for the distinction between first philosophy and special sciences lies in 
that the latter do not say whether or not the class of being on which they focus exists, since 
the rational procedure that leads to the essence of a thing is the same as the one that leads to 
knowledge of the existence of a thing. In other words, we can only wonder what object we 
are dealing with if we know that it exists.63 While the special sciences are unable to explain 
either the essence or the existence of the object on which they focus, philosophy is capable of 
doing both. It explains the essence and the existence of its object, i.e. of being qua being, 
distinguishing between its meanings, that is categories, demonstrating that the first of these is 
the substance, and indicating its principles.64 Pseudo-Alexander again uses the example of 
medicine, saying that it does not demonstrate the essence of fire, nor does it consider whether 
man - its object - exists or not. This happens because it would only be possible to demonstrate 
that man exists if it were possible to demonstrate that man is a ‘terrestrial biped animal’. 
Since it is impossible to demonstrate this definition65, it is likewise impossible to demonstrate 
that man exists.66 
Aristotle then proceeds to show that physical science is one of the theoretical sciences, 
the goal of which is knowledge of the truth.67 He says that physics is concerned with a 
particular genus of being, i.e. the substance that has the principle of its movement and rest 
62 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 360, 1-10. 
63 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 1, 1025 b 16-18. Cf. Aristotle, An. post. II 1, 89 b 34-35. 
64 Cf. Movia, Introduzione, p. LXXXIV and note 28. 
65 On this issue pseudo-Alexander rightly refers to the Posterior Analytics (cf. Aristotle, An. post. II 8, 
93 a 3-15; 93 b 15-20). Cf. Mario Mignucci, L’argomentazione dimostrativa in Aristotele. Commento 
agli Analitici secondi, vol. I (Padova; Antenore 1975), p. 331. Cf. Movia, Introduzione, p. LXXXIV 
and note 30. 
66 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 442, 5-12.  
67 Aristotle, Metaph. α 1, 993 b 20-21. 
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present in itself. So physics can be neither a productive science (since the principle of 
productions is in what it produces, and this is either intellect or art, or some other faculty), 
nor a practical science (because the principle of the action lies in the agent, and is the 
disposition; in fact, the object of the action and of the disposition coincide).68 On the matter 
of natural bodies - the object of physical science - pseudo-Alexander poses the problem of 
how the celestial bodies can be considered as such, given that they do not seem to possess the 
principle of rest, being endowed with circular and eternal movement. The commentator adds, 
however, that their revolving around the same point, and never changing place equates to 
being in a state of rest, or remaining immovable.69 This explanation goes along with 
Aristotle’s view that every planet is carried by a sphere that moves in a circle, and therefore 
constantly around the same points.70 Then pseudo-Alexander says that, insofar as philosophy 
studies being qua being, and seeks its principles, and bearing in mind that to understand 
being qua being is to have the ability to clarify the essence of things, we clearly also need to 
search for the essence.71 In agreement with Movia, it is important to specify that the 
commentator means not that philosophy should explain the essence of natural entities, but 
that it should search for the essence of a being considered qua being. It should try to establish 
what makes a given being that particular being or, in other words, to seek its primary 
causes.72 As an example of practical science, pseudo-Alexander mentions dancing, making 
the very acute observation that, after dancing, nothing remains.73 While it is true that 
Aristotle would classify the art of dancing as a productive science74, the observation that 
nothing remains afterwards recalls the knowledge  and the pleasure that Aristotle admits arise 
from the fine arts, which  brings them closer to the theoretical sciences.75 
In pseudo-Philoponus’s commentary, physics is defined as a ‘contemplative, not active 
science’76, underscoring the rational, speculative nature of the theoretical sciences vis-à-vis 
the practical and productive sciences. Inasmuch as it is research and investigation, Aristotle’s 
68 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 1, 1025 b 18-24. 
69 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 442, 29-35. 
70 Cf. Aristotle, De caelo ΙΙ 8, 289 b 1-290 a 35. 
71 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 443, 1-6. 
72 Cf. Movia, Introduzione, p. LXXXV. 
73 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 443, 38. 
74 Cf. Aristotle, Poet. 1, 1447 a 16, 26 28; 4, 1448 b 4-17.  
75 Cf. Movia, Introduzione, p. LXXXV. 
76 Cf. pseudo-Philoponus, In Metaph., p. 24 r.  
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θεωρία should not be envisaged as an acritical attitude to reality. It is worth noting another 
similarity between the commentaries of pseudo-Philoponus and pseudo-Alexander: in both 
cases, Aristotle’s claim that physics is a theoretical science is interpreted as the conclusion of 
a syllogism, that the two authors describe in almost exactly the same terms.77 Aristotle 
justifies the classification of physics as a theoretical science by saying that this science must 
involve knowledge about such being as admits of being moved, and about substance in the 
sense of form (περὶ οὐσίαν τὴν κατὰ τὸν λόγον)78, and considered mainly as inseparable from 
matter.79 Pseudo-Alexander interprets the passage in the sense that:  
physics considers the material substance, but only to a lesser degree, while it is concerned to a greater 
degree and for the most part with the substance according to the definition and form. Having said that 
for the most part it studies the substance according to the definition, and having added “not only 
separable”, [Arist.] seems to mean that this science is not only concerned with the separate, but also 
with the inseparable form.  He does not mean to say, however, that it is concerned with both the 
separable and the inseparable, but he says ‘not only separable’ instead of ‘only not separable’. In other 
words, he <affirms> that this science only concerns the inseparable substance, that cannot be 
separated from matter.80 
According to the commentator, the object of physics would be partly the material 
substance, but to a greater degree the substance considered according to the definition (λόγος) 
or form, i.e., the substance inseparable from matter.81 In fact, the expression οὐ χωριστὴν 
μόνον would equate to μόνον οὐ χωριστόν, so physics would not deal with both separate and 
inseparable substances. The object of physics would consist in forms exhibited in definitions 
77 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 443, 7-10:  ἡ φυσικὴ ἐπιστήμη ἐστί, πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη ἢ 
θεωρητικὴ ἢ πρακτικὴ ἢ ποιητική ἐστιν· καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ [ἔσται] ἐπιστήμη ἢ θεωρητικὴ ἢ πρακτικὴ ἢ 
ποιητικὴ ἔσται· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὔτε πρακτικὴ οὔτε ποιητική ἐστι· θεωρητικὴ ἄρα.= pseudo-Philoponus, In 
Metaph., p. 24 r: Physica, scientia est; omnis scientia vel contemplativa, vel activa, vel factiva est. Et 
physica ergo vel contemplativa, vel activa, vel factiva erit. Sed enim, neque activa, neque factiva est 
[…] contemplativa ergo erit. 
78 The expression has been interpreted in various ways. On this issue, see Norma Cauli, Commento al 
libro Ε (sesto). Presentazione, traduzione e note, in Movia, Commentario alla “Metafisica”, pp. 1129-
1191, spec. p. 1182 note 70.  
79 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. Ε 1, 1025 b 25-28.  
80 Pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 444, 9-15: ἡ φυσικὴ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὑλικὴν οὐσίαν, ἀλλ’ ἐπ’ 
ἔλαττον, ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ ἐστι περὶ οὐσίαν τὴν κατὰ τὸν λόγον καὶ τὸ εἶδος. εἰπὼν δὲ 
ὅτι περὶ οὐσίαν τὴν κατὰ τὸν λόγον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, καὶ προσθεὶς τὸ οὐ χωριστὴν μόνον, δοκεῖ λέγειν 
ὅτι περὶ εἶδός ἐστιν οὐ χωριστὸν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀχώριστον. οὐ τοῦτο δὲ λέγει ὅτι καὶ περὶ χωριστόν 
ἐστι καὶ περὶ ἀχώριστον, ἀλλὰ τὸ οὐ χωριστὸν μόνον ἀντὶ τοῦ μόνον οὐ χωριστὸν εἶπεν· ἤτοι περὶ 
οὐσίαν μόνον ἀχώριστον καὶ μὴ δυναμένην χωρίζεσθαι τῆς ὕλης.  
81 So also Bonitz (cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysik, übersetzt Hermann Bonitz, neu bearbeitet, mit 
Einleitung und Kommentar, hrsg. v. Horst Seidl, griechischer Text in der Edition von Wilhelm Christ, 
Hamburg 1978, Bd. 1, pp. 282-283); Jules Tricot, Aristote, La Metaphysique, nouvelle éd. entièrement 
refondue avec commentaire (Paris, Vrin 1962), vol. I, p. 330 and note 1.  
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- in which matter appears too,  however.82 Asclepius comments on Aristotle’s claim that 
physics83 is concerned with such genus of being as has the principle of its movement and rest 
present in itself84, and specifies that first philosophy deals with immovable substances. He 
also emphasizes that physics is concerned with material forms85, whereas first philosophy 
focuses not on natural and moving entities, but only on immaterial and immovable 
substances. Since these substances are the principles of all things, however, first philosophy 
will focus on all entities.86 
Aristotle reiterates and clarifies this point immediately afterwards, when he says that 
physics is concerned with substance as defined for the most part only as not separable from 
matter. This rules out the mathematical entities (e.g. the snub), which are defined in relation 
to intelligible matter and not to sensible matter, and also the rational soul, which might 
possibly exist independently of the body.87  Going against the Platonics, pseudo-Alexander 
claims that a natural form cannot exist per se, separate from matter.88 A little later on, 
referring to Aristotle’s example of the snub89, he says it is impossible to define natural forms 
separately from matter. Referring to Metaph. Z 12, 1037 b 27-32, the commentator states that 
by ‘matter’ of the definition of natural entities we must therefore mean the genus and the 
differences preceding the ultimate difference.90 Pseudo-Alexander subsequently identifies 
matter with movement91, while for Aristotle movement is a property of the matter of sensible 
entities.92 As for the comment in Asclepius on 1025 b 28-30, it is worth emphasizing that the 
82 Cf. Movia, Introduzione, p. LXXXVI and note 42. The same was true of Bonitz (cf. Metaph., pp. 
282-283); Tricot, Metaph., I, p. 330 and n. 1. Cf. Norma Cauli, in Movia, Commentario alla 
“Metafisica”, p. 1182 note 70. 
83 In Asclepius the term φυσική corresponds to φυσιολογία, and the term  φυσικοί coincides with 
φυσιολόγοι. 
84 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 1, 1025 b 26-27.  
85 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 360, 25-27. Thus Tricot, Metaph., I, p. 330 note 1; Giovanni Reale, 
Introduzione, traduzione e commentario alla Metafisica di Aristotele (Milano, Bompiani 2004), pp. 
977-978 note 9.  
86 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 361, 26-32. Cf. Klaus Kremer, Der Metaphysikbegriff in den 
Aristoteles-Kommentaren der Ammonius-Schule (Münster, Aschendorff 1961), pp. 40-44. 
87 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 1, 1025 b 28-1026 a 6. Cf. Movia, Introduzione, p. LXXXVI. 
88 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 444, 25-27. Cf. Movia, Introduzione, p. LXXXVI. 
89 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 1, 1025 b 34-1026 b 5. 
90 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 444, 30-33. Cf. Movia, Introduzione, p. LXXXVI. 
91 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 445, 8-9. Cf. Movia, Introduzione, p. LXXXVI.  
92 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. H 1, 1042 b 5-6. Cf. Movia, Introduzione, p. LXXXVI. 
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commentator believes physics must be concerned with material forms and their differences: 
we cannot simply say of the form (σχήμα) of the hand that it is such a thing (i.e. that it is 
made in a certain way), we have to deal also with the act (ἐνέργεια), with the fact that the 
hand is designed to grasp and throw, for instance.93  Asclepius therefore sees the differences 
that, together with the form, define an entity in terms of the act of the entity, the action that 
characterizes it and distinguishes it from other things. 
Aristotle moves on to deal with the second theoretical or dianoetic science94 - 
mathematics - and makes the point that it is still not clear whether it is a science of 
immovable and separate beings, even though some parts of mathematics clearly consider 
their objects as immovable and separate.95 Pseudo-Alexander explains this passage with a 
syllogism that appears in a virtually identical form in pseudo-Philoponus’s commentary too.96 
The difference between the theoretical sciences is explained as follows: 
Cum discreverit physicam a mathematica, nunc discernit primam philosophiam a mathematica et a 
physica, et duos texit syllogismos. Physica circa inseparabilia et mobilia, prima philosophia circa 
separata et immobilia, et rursus. Mathematica circa immobilia quaedam, sed non etiam inseparabilia. 
Prima vero philosophia, et circa immobilia et circa separata est.97 
On this topic we have to agree with Klaus Kremer, when he points out that, in 1026 a 14 
(unlike 1025 b 28, where he claims that the object of physics is οὐ χωριστόν), Aristotle would 
be saying that the object of physics would be χωριστόν, that in this case would indicate the 
substantial being. According to Kremer, physics would deal with entities that can exist per se, 
in contrast with mathematical entities that, being accidents, are οὐκ χωριστά. Pseudo-
Philoponus (who Kremer believes to be the authentic Philoponus) would interpret the 
Aristotelian term χωριστόν in the sense of abstraction.98 Pseudo-Alexander reads ᾗ χωριστά 
93 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 361, 8-12. This point of view is repeated, particularly in 361, 19-20. 
94 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 1, 1025 b 25.   
95 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 1, 1026 a 8-11. I accept Schwegler’s proposal that we read μὴ χωριστά 
instead of ᾗ χωριστά on lines 9-10. Cf. Albert Schwegler, Die Metaphysik des Aristoteles, Grundtext, 
Übersetzung und Commentar, nebst Erläuternden Abhandlungen, Bd. 4 (Frankfurt am Main, Minerva 
1960), pp. 14-16; Movia, following Ross, Metaph., vol. I, p. 355, believes instead that Aristotle is 
referring to pure mathematics as separable with thought from matter (cf. Movia, Introduzione, pp. 
LXXXVI-LXXXVII). 
96 Pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., pp. 445, 22-24 ἡ φυσικὴ διανοητικὴ οὖσα οὔτε περὶ ἀκίνητα οὔτε 
περὶ χωριστά ἐστιν· ἡ φυσικὴ ἄρα οὐκ ἔστι μαθηματική = pseudo-Philoponus, In Metaph., p. 24 r: 
Mathematica dianoetica existens, circa immobilia et separata est. Physica, dianoetica cum sit, neque 
circa immobilia, neque circa separata est. Physica ergo mathematica non est.  
97 Pseudo-Philoponus, In Metaph., p. 24 r f. 
98 Cf. Kremer, Metaphysikbegriff, p. 68 note 244. 
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in 1026 a 9-1099, and seems to be referring to pure mathematics when he speaks of «some 
objects inasmuch as they are immovable and inasmuch as they are separate» (probably 
meaning numbers and quantities).100  
Aristotle finally says that, if it is true that something eternal, immovable and separate 
exists, it must be the object of a theoretical science - not physics (since this is concerned with 
entities in motion), or mathematics, but a science that is prior to them. In fact, physics studies 
realities that are not separate101 and not immovable, and some mathematics concerns realities 
that are immovable and not separate, but immanent to matter, whereas separate and 
immovable substances are the object of first philosophy.102 Pseudo-Alexander makes the 
point that, if an eternal, immovable and separate entity exists, it must be the cause of other 
things.103 He interprets Aristotle’s claim that it is necessary for all causes to be eternal104 in 
the sense that, if every cause were generated, the series of causes would go on to infinity.105 
The same explanation can be found in Asclepius.106 Aristotle goes on to say that the 
immovable and separate realities forming the object of first philosophy must, above all, be 
divine, since «they are the causes of the divine as appears to us».107 Pseudo-Alexander 
describes this last expression as «more obscure because of the brevity of the discourse»108, 
and he interprets it as meaning that the immovable and separate entities would be the causes 
of the divine entities, i.e. of the spheres and of the divine bodies, the unmoved movers, which 
would be the cause behind the fact that the bodies that we see are generated and destroyed109. 
Asclepius110 and pseudo-Philoponus111 also identify the eternal causes with the unmoved 
99 So also Asclepius (cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 363, 7-8). 
100 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 445, 31. Cf. Movia, Introduzione, p. XXXVII. 
101 I follow the codices in reading ἀχώριστα in 1026 a 14, as in pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 445, 
38; Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 363, 18, while Schwegler and the other modern editors of the 
Metaphysics (except for Bekker and Bonitz) correct the term to read χωριστά. 
102 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 1, 1026 a 10-16. 
103 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 446, 11-12. Cf. Movia, Introduzione, p. LXXXVII. 
104 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 1, 1026 a 16-17. 
105 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 446, 12-13. Cf. Movia, Introduzione, p. LXXXVII. 
106 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 363, 27-29.  
107 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 1, 1026 a 17-18. 
108 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 446, 16-17.  
109 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 446, 17-20. 
110 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 363, 29-30. 
111 Cf. pseudo-Philoponus, In Metaph., p. 24 v. 
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movers of the skies, consistently with the theologizing interpretation of Aristotle’s 
metaphysics. 
In the final part of the chapter, Aristotle states that there are three branches of 
theoretical philosophy - mathematics, physics and theology. At the top, Aristotle places 
theological science, which investigates the highest object of reality, and that is why it can be 
called ‘theological’.112 Pseudo-Alexander says that, if the divine is the thing most worthy of 
honor, then - of all the sciences - theology must be the science most worthy of honor 
(τιμιωτάτη). It will be concerned with the divine genus of reality, and it will be the most 
highly esteemed science, that has as its object what there is of greatest value.113 Asclepius 
describes theological science in the same terms.114 The chapter ends with one of Aristotle’s 
most problematic and often discussed passages: the aporia that poses the problem of whether 
first philosophy is the science of being qua being, and therefore universal, or whether it is a 
special science coinciding with theology, which has immovable and separate substances as its 
object. Aristotle offers the example of mathematics, where geometry and astronomy concern 
a given reality, while general mathematics is common to all realities. If no other substance 
existed beyond the natural substances, then physics would be the first science. But if an 
immovable substance exists, this will be prior (προτέρα), and first philosophy will be the first 
science, and it will be universal specifically because it is the first. This science would be 
concerned with the being qua being, or in other words with what being is and the properties it 
possesses.115  
Pseudo-Alexander explains that Aristotle’s suggested alternative consists in examining 
whether first philosophy is universal, and thus includes and stands above all the sciences (just 
as particulars come under the universal), or whether it is not universal, but like medicine and 
astronomy, which delimit and are concerned with a certain part of being.116 Pseudo-
Alexander rightly goes on to rule out the possibility of first philosophy and the special 
sciences being related like genus to species, as in the relationship between universal 
mathematics and special mathematics. The commentator follows Aristotle’s text, making the 
primacy of first philosophy depend on its object, which is the immovable and separate 
112 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 1, 1026 a 18-23. Cf. Movia, Introduzione, p. LXXXVII. 
113 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., pp. 446, 35-447, 7. Cf. Movia, Introduzione, p. LXXXVII. 
114 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 364, 1-3.  
115 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 1, 1026 a 23-32. Cf. Movia, Introduzione, p. LXXXVII. 
116 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 447, 9-14. 
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substance, or the first substance. He explains that the universal character of first philosophy 
should be intended as meaning not that this science includes the others, but in the sense of 
what is most worthy of honor, and pseudo-Philoponus takes the same view.117 Pseudo-
Alexander does not clarify the identification of first philosophy with the science of being qua 
being, however.118 Asclepius says that the first science is universal specifically because it is 
the first, that is because it has in itself the principles of all things. That is why this science is 
concerned with being simply (ἁπλῶς) and it explains that this means God, who provides for 
all things and, strictly speaking, has no privations.119 We read in pseudo-Philoponus’s 
commentary that, if an immovable and separate substance exists, the universal science will 
not be physics, but the science concerned with contemplating (contemplari) being qua 
being.120 His use of the verb contemplari again denotes the speculative nature of first 
philosophy, clearly distinct from that of practical philosophy or productive philosophy. 
According to Movia, Aristotle’s solution to the aporia would lie in that, for there to be a 
science of being qua being, which is the broadest of all objects, we need to seek the primary 
causes. But, since the primary causes are the most universal, the science of primary causes 
must be the most universal science. Now, the primary cause of entities, in the order of 
efficient causality, is the immovable substance. As a consequence, the science that has as its 
object the immovable substance or ‘theology’, inasmuch as it is the first science, is one and 
the same as the science of being qua being, or ‘ontology’.121 In fact, the alternative Aristotle 
suggests in his formulation of the aporia in 1026 a 23-24 concerns the universality of 
metaphysics as opposed to its identification with a particular science, so this is the same 
alternative as the one in Metaph. Γ 1, between the science of being qua being and the special 
sciences. The solution to the aporia - which rules out the particular nature of first philosophy 
being due simply to it coming ‘first’ inasmuch as it is the science of the immovable substance 
- would therefore seem to indicate that the science of being qua being fully coincides with the 
117 Cf. pseudo-Philoponus, In Metaph., p. 24 v. 
118 Cf. pseudo-Philoponus, In Metaph., p. 447, 19-36. Cf. Movia, Introduzione, p. LXXXVIII, where 
it is also rightly said that pseudo-Alexander’s failure to explain the relationship of identity that links 
the science of being qua being with the science of the primary substance marks a step back vis-à-vis 
the authentic Alexander, who clearly bears his mind the role in this context of the concept of cause 
(cf. Alex. In Metaph., p. 246, 10-13; but see also pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 446, 11-12). 
119 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 364, 24-27. 
120 Cf. pseudo-Philoponus, In Metaph., p. 24 v. 
121 Cf. Movia, Introduzione, p. LXXXVIII and note 58. The reduction of ontology to theology is 
accepted by Kirwan, Metaphysics, pp. 188-189, but rejected by Berti, Métaphysique, pp. 127-128. 
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science having as its object the immovable substance. This conclusive passage in chapter I, 
and the primacy of theology over the other sciences are two of the fundamental passages 
prompting the conception of Aristotle’s metaphysics as a theological science. A further 
passage - this time with a negative sense, as we shall see - can be found in his subsequent 
discussion of the meanings of being, and particularly of accidental being.  
 
2. Accidental being 
 
In the second chapter of Book Ε Aristotle discusses the four meanings of unqualified 
term ‘being’: (1) accidental being; (2) being as truth and not-being as falsity; (3) the figures 
of predication; and (4) being potentially and actually. His use of the imperfect tense ἦν in 
1026 a 34 to indicate accidental being leads us to believe that he was referring to an earlier 
work.122 The ancient commentators do not refer us to any previous work, however, with the 
exception of pseudo-Alexander, who simply recalls that this issue has already been 
discussed.123 Modern scholars believe the reference is to Book Δ of the Metaphysics.124 
Pseudo-Alexander justifies the subsequent treatment of accidental being, and of being as truth 
and not-being as falsity already in a comment on this passage in Aristotle. The commentator 
says we must start by assuming that there can be no science of accidental being because 
theological science comes before the other sciences, and it only studies being qua being and 
its properties.125 To the commentators, the result that Aristotle reaches will seem, in a sense, 
rather like a negation that excludes certain meanings of being from scientific inquiry, thereby 
also placing them beyond the object of metaphysics. The subsequent chapters in Book E are 
consequently seen as serving the purpose of demonstrating what should be excluded from the 
sphere of first philosophy proper. 
To explain accidental being, pseudo-Alexander says that, while the sculptor is a per se 
cause of the statue, Polyclitus accidentally causes it because Polyclitus happens to be 
sculptor. In actual fact, since Polyclitus is a sculptor, Aristotle would say that he is a per se 
cause of the statue. Then the commentator takes an example of being as truth concerning 
Socrates, of whom - when he is seated – it is true to say that he is seated, that is, he is said to 
122 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 2, 1026 a 33-b 2. 
123 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 448, 2: εἴρηται. 
124 Cf. Bonitz, Ross, Tricot, Kirwan, Reale. For further details, see Berti, Métaphysique, pp. 134-136. 
125 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., pp. 447, 38-448, 15. 
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be. Following Aristotle’s text, pseudo-Alexander gives an example of the figures of 
predication, considering the first category: the essence, i.e. the substance126, and therefore 
quantity and quality. Finally, as concerns being potentially and actually, the commentator 
quotes the case of water, which is actually water, and of air and fire, which are potentially 
water because they can become water.127 Asclepius also provides examples of the four 
meanings of being. Accidental being is explained with the case of the bald house-builder, 
who does not build because he is bald, but because he is a builder. For being as truth and not-
being as falsity, he uses the example of Socrates, of whom it is true to say that he is Socrates 
if it is really him, and if not it is false. On the concept of the figures of predication, i.e. of 
being per se, Asclepius speaks of the essence, quality and quantity, and mentions man, 
magnitude, and white, respectively, as examples of them. As for being potentially and 
actually, he gives the example of sperm, which is potentially a child, and what it has 
become.128  
Aristotle begins by dealing with accidental being and shows that there is no science of 
it. As proof (σημεῖον) of this, he mentions the fact that none of the sciences - be they 
practical, productive, or theoretical - are concerned with accidents. He refers to architectural 
science, which causes the house, but is not responsible for the accidental properties that the 
house will come to have, which are infinite: some will find the house pleasant, some will 
judge it hurtful, to others it will seem useful and - Aristotle adds - different from all other 
things.129 Asclepius ignores this addition, whereas pseudo-Alexander mentions it, and says 
that nobody is concerned with whether the house as built is different from or identical to man, 
or whether it differs from all sensitive and intelligible beings.130 A similar explanation can be 
found in pseudo-Philoponus, which goes to show yet again that he draws on pseudo-
Alexander’s commentary.131 The same examples can also be found in the two works relating 
126 Cf. Mignucci, L’argomentazione, vol. I, p. 532, where we find that τί in 1026 a 6 equates to the 
category of substance. Cf. Cauli, in Movia, Commentario alla “Metafisica”, p. 1184 note 122.  
127 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 448, 2-13. In fact, Aristotle accepts the reciprocal 
transformation of the elements. Cf. Aristotle, De gen. et corr. II 4.  
128 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 364, 30-365,6. 
129 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 2, 1026 b 2-10.  
130 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 448, 21-23: ὁμοίως δὲ οὐ σκοπεῖ εἴπερ ἡ γινομένη οἰκία 
ἑτέρα ἐστὶν ἢ ἡ αὐτὴ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ἁπλῶς εἰ ὑπάρχει ἑτέρα ἁπάντων τῶν ὄντων αἰσθητῶν καὶ 
νοητῶν, οὐδὲν ἐννοεῖ. 
131 Cf. pseudo-Philoponus, In Metaph., p. 24 v: Similiter neque de eodem considerat et altero circa 
domum. Si quidem quae fit domus eadem est, vel alteri homini, vel animali. 
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to 1026 b 7-8: pseudo-Alexander says that no architect will wonder whether the house is 
good for Socrates or whether it is unhealthy for Plato, pleasant for Theophrastus, or unhealthy 
for Alexander. In pseudo-Philoponus, we find the passage repeated almost word for word, 
apart from the inversion of the names of Socrates and Plato.132 
Having used the example of architecture (which is a productive science), Aristotle 
claims that geometry (which is a theoretical science) likewise does not study the accident of 
its objects, i.e.  figures.  It is not concerned, for instance, with the question of whether there is 
a difference between a triangle and a triangle having its angles equating to two right 
angles.133 Asclepius explains Aristotle’s passage with the example of the geometer, who is 
not concerned with whether triangles are on the  right or left. He only studies the properties 
that belong per se to the figures, such as - in the case of triangles - the property of having its 
angles equating to two right angles.134 So, what Aristotle sees as a matter of no concern to the 
geometer becomes quite the opposite in Asclepius, an example of what the geometer studies. 
A little later on, Asclepius adds that the geometer is not concerned with the question of 
whether the triangle is made of silver, bronze, or any other material.135 Pseudo-Alexander 
explains, probably on the strength of this passage136, that the geometer is not interested in 
whether figures are made of wood or stone, and accuses Aristotle of having incompletely 
formulated the example of the triangle. According to pseudo-Alexander, the wording of the 
phrase should have implied the expression «wooden», or something similar, so the meaning 
would have been137: «nor is he concerned with establishing whether a wooden triangle is 
different from a triangle as such, and what its nature might be, in the sense of whether its 
angles equal two right angles, but he is only interested in whether  the three angles of every 
triangle always equal two right angles».138 By adding that the geometer does not consider 
whether the triangles are made of stone or wood, pseudo-Alexander shows that he believes 
132 Cf. pseudo-Philoponus, In Metaph., p. 24 v: Vel quia, Socrati verbi causa, conferet, Platoni autem 
non conferet. Vel Theophrasto quidem iucunda, Alexandro autem molesta = pseudo-Alexander, In 
Metaph., p. 448, 19-22: εἰ ἡ γινομένη οἰκία τῷ Σωκράτει φέρε εἰπεῖν νοσώδης ἐστὶ καὶ τῷ Πλάτωνι 
ὑγιεινή, ἢ Θεοφράστῳ μὲν ἡδεῖα Ἀλεξάνδρῳ δὲ λυπηρά. 
133 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 2, 1026 b 10-12.  
134 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 365, 12-17. 
135 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 366, 2-3. 
136 Cf. Berti, Métaphysique, p. 140. 
137 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 448, 27-31. 
138 Pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 448, 31-34: οὐδ’ εἰ ἕτερόν ἐστι τὸ ξύλινον τρίγωνον καὶ ἕτερον 
αὐτὸ τὸ τρίγωνον καὶ ἡ φύσις αὐτοῦ, ἀντὶ τοῦ τὸ ἔχον τὰς τρεῖς δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας, θεωρεῖ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο 
μόνον ζητεῖ, εἰ παντὸς τριγώνου αἱ τρεῖς γωνίαι δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσαι εἰσίν. 
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the accidental properties of the triangle consist not in having angles that equal two right 
angles, but in being made of stone or wood. The same view can be found in pseudo-
Philoponus.139 Schwegler140 and Bonitz141 consider pseudo-Alexander’s interpretation 
feasible, but both say that such an interpretation would be inconsistent with what Aristotle 
says in Metaph. Δ 30, 1025 a 32 about the property of a triangle with its angles equating to 
two right angles being an accident, albeit per se. Pseudo-Alexander’s comment was also 
rejected by Ross, who rightly said that the sense of Aristotle’s passage is that the geometer 
does not wonder whether the triangle as such, i.e. considered simply as a figure made of 
straight lines with three angles, is the same thing as the triangle considered as having its 
angles corresponding to two right angles. According to Ross, Aristotle wants to give an 
example of ‘accidental being’, such that the accident of the triangle that is of no interest to the 
geometer is not that of the triangle ‘having its angles equal to two right angles’, but that of 
the triangle ‘being the same as, or different from the triangle that has angles equal to two 
right angles’.142 In fact, we have to assume that Aristotle’s example concerns ‘accidental 
being’, and not just the accidental properties of the triangle. The sense of the passage thus 
seems to be that the geometer is not concerned with establishing whether the triangle as such 
differs from the triangle having angles equal to two right angles, just as the architect is not 
concerned with whether the house as such differs from the house inasmuch as it has certain 
characteristics. 
Referring to the architect’s and geometer’s lack of interest in the accidental being, 
Aristotle says this happens for a good reason since the accident is like a name.143 Asclepius144 
and pseudo-Alexander145 read ὄνομά τι μόνον in 1026 b 13, while the codices have ὀνόματι. 
According to Asclepius, the formula means that accidental being has no stable and 
autonomous existence, but has its being in other things, and it is in what accompanies it 
(παρακολούθημα).146 Pseudo-Alexander suggests that accidentally being is like the 
139 Cf. pseudo-Philoponus, In Metaph., p. 24 v: Geometra, considerat ea quae secundum accidens 
insunt figuris, si ligneus est cubus, vel aereus triangulus. 
140 Cf. Schwegler, Metaphysik, Bd. 4, p. 21. 
141 Cf. Bonitz, Metaph., p. 287. 
142 Ross, Metaph., vol. I, p. 358. 
143 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 2, 1026 b 13-14.  
144 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 365, 21-22. 
145 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 448, 36. 
146 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 367, 21-23.  
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hircocervus, which is by no means an object, a certain nature, or a kind of entity. The 
commentator adds that saying that a house is unhealthy or healthy is only giving it a name, it 
does not express a reality. If ‘unhealthy’ or ‘healthy’ were something substantial, then the 
house would be unhealthy or healthy for all those who enter it, whereas it happens that for 
some it is unhealthy and for others it is healthy.147 The example of the hircocervus can be 
found in pseudo-Philoponus too.148 Pseudo-Alexander should be acknowledged the merit for 
his conviction that Aristotle’s discourse focused not on accident, but on accidental being.149   
Asclepius introduces his comment on this section of Aristotle’s text by saying that, 
since wisdom (σοφία) is concerned with being, and since being can be used in many senses 
(i.e. being as truth, being potentially and actually, and being per se, including the ten 
categories), Aristotle would be saying that wisdom is concerned with all the meanings of 
being. The only exception (χωρίς) is accidental being, since it is indeterminate, without 
cause, and impossible to bring down primarily to the God and nature150, i.e. to what is 
always, or for the most part.151 Here Asclepius goes beyond Aristotle, who actually says it is 
not for metaphysics to be concerned with being as truth and not-being as falsity either. But 
the commentator’s statement fully justifies the discussion of accidental being in Book E: 
Aristotle wants to show that it should be excluded from the object of the first science - what 
is called ‘wisdom’ here, and the science of primary causes in Metaph. A, which is also the 
science most possessed by the God152, whereas accident is said to be ‘without cause’. 
Straight afterwards, Aristotle says this is the reason why Plato, in a sense rightly, 
considered Sophistry as the science of not-being. In fact, the Sophists’ discussions - says 
Aristotle - focus mainly on accident. For instance, they pose the problem of whether 
‘musician’ and ‘grammarian’, or ‘Coriscus’ or ‘Coriscus the musician’ are different or 
identical. The Sophists also wonder whether all that is, but that is not eternal, has come into 
being, and thus whether someone who is a musician has become a grammarian or whether, 
being a grammarian, he has become a musician, and other questions of this type.153 The 
147 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 448, 35-449, 6.  
148 Cf. pseudo-Philoponus, In Metaph., p. 24 v. The same example can be found in Aristotle, De 
interpr., 16a16. 
149 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., pp. 448, 35-39; 449, 7.  
150 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 365, 23-29. 
151 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 2, 1026 b 28-33.  
152 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. A 2, 983 a 6-10.  
153 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 2, 1026 b 14-21. 
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quotation from Plato sounds like a reference to the Sophist. On this issue, Asclepius mentions 
that Aristotle correctly says that Plato was right in a sense (τρόπον τινά), since accidents have 
some sort of obscure existence.154 Pseudo-Alexander justifies the reference to Plato by saying 
that Sophistry deals with accidental being because it is only a name, not something that is155. 
So «Plato classifies it as an activity that focuses on not-being, in the sense that the accident is 
not-being».156 The same explanation can be found in pseudo-Philoponus.157  
Asclepius writes that Aristotle’s passage contains three paralogisms:  
1) If, posed the question «Are musicians and grammarians identical or different?», we answer 
that musicians are different from grammarians, the Sophist will reply that they are in the 
same subject, for instance in Coriscus; if we answer that musicians and grammarians are 
identical, the Sophist will say that they are identical in different subjects, e.g. the musician is 
in Aristoxenus and the grammarian in Coriscus. In both cases, we are misled. According to 
Asclepius, we could answer that musician and grammarian are accidents of the same subject, 
and it is not impossible for them, though different, to belong to the same subject.  
2) If, when asked the question «Are musician and Coriscus identical or different?», we 
answer that they are different, the Sophist will tell us that in that case Coriscus will differ 
from himself, since Coriscus is a musician; and if we answer that they are identical, the 
Sophist will say that Coriscus must therefore have come into being the moment he became a 
musician; both answers are clearly absurd. On the other hand, Asclepius suggests that our 
answer might be that Coriscus is no less Coriscus before and after becoming a musician: in 
fact, the accident may or may not come about without damaging the subject.  
3) If, posed the question «Is Coriscus the musician a grammarian, or has he become a 
grammarian?», we answer that he is a grammarian, then the Sophist will reply that in that 
case Coriscus has always been a musician and a grammarian; if we say instead that Coriscus 
has become a grammarian, the Sophist will tell us that Coriscus has become a grammarian 
starting from being a musician and therefore, if everything that comes into being comes from 
not-being, the musician is not-being. Again both answers are absurd.  
        Asclepius claims that, against such paralogisms, we might say that the Sophist confuses 
absolute not-being with not-being in some way (being a musician, for instance). As a 
154 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 366, 8-10. 
155 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 449, 6-8.  
156 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 449, 8-9.  
157 Cf. pseudo-Philoponus, In Metaph., p. 24 v: Ideo et Plato, circa non ens sophistica ordinavit, vel 
circa accidens. 
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consequence, the commentator concludes, accidents are indefinite, they are causes of 
paralogisms, and - in a way - they are non-existent.158 For the purposes of what we intend to 
demonstrate here, it is emblematic that Asclepius should conclude his comment on this 
section by emphasizing that the aim of the discussion on accidental being is to demonstrate 
that it should be excluded from the object of wisdom159, while the reference to the other 
sciences is left unexplained. 
Pseudo-Alexander writes that, posed the question «Are a grammarian and a musician 
identical or different?», if we answer that they are different, the Sophists will reply that 
Socrates is a grammarian, and that Socrates the grammarian is identical to Socrates. But 
Socrates is also a musician, so Socrates will be identical to Socrates the musician, and this 
means that Socrates the musician is identical to Socrates the grammarian - but then 
‘musician’ will also be identical to ‘grammarian’. The commentator goes on to say that, if 
‘musician’ is different from ‘grammarian’, then Socrates the musician must be different from 
Socrates the grammarian, and therefore Socrates will be different from himself. According to 
pseudo-Alexander, the paralogism stems from the fact that ‘musical-Socrates’ and 
‘grammarian-Socrates’ are and are not identical: they are identical inasmuch as concerns the 
subject (τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ), but not inasmuch as concerns the discourse (τῷ λόγῳ). On the other 
hand, if we answer the question «Are a grammarian and a musician identical or different?» by 
saying that ‘musician’ and ‘grammarian’ are identical, the Sophists will answer that, if that is 
the case, where there is a grammarian, there will also be a musician, but Aristarchus is a 
grammarian but not a musician, so a grammarian is not identical to a musician.160 The topic is 
covered in much the same way in pseudo-Philoponus’s commentary.161  
Aristotle moves on to say that the accidental is akin to not-being, as emerges from the 
following argument: beings that are in another way are generated and destroyed, while 
accidental beings give rise to no generation or destruction.162 Asclepius and pseudo-
Alexander interpret 1026 b 18-20 as another question formulated by the Sophists.163 Pseudo-
158 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., pp. 366, 10-367, 17. 
159 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 367, 17-18: πῶς οὖν διαλέξεται ἡ σοφία τὸ θειότατον πρᾶγμα περὶ 
τοῦ τοιούτου ὄντος; 
160 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 449, 11-27.  
161 Cf. pseudo-Philoponus, In Metaph., p. 24 v. 
162 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 2, 1026 b 21-24. 
163 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 367, 21-31; pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 450, 14-15. Cf. infra, § 
3. 
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Alexander explains that the Sophists wonder whether everything that exists now, and that 
once did not exist, has been generated. If a thing did not exist at first, and now it does, it must 
have been generated. This line of argument is applied to the previously-described 
paralogisms: if Coriscus, who was first a musician, is now a grammarian, then the musician 
has become a grammarian, and the grammarian had become a musician. So, if the Sophists 
pose questions of this kind, the accident is something similar to not-being. Pseudo-Alexander 
concludes by saying that, since accidental beings do not give rise to generation and 
destruction, they are non-entities, and he defers an explanation to his comment on E 3.164 
Pseudo-Philoponus comments on this passage by noting that, if the accident were generated, 
then either the grammarian would be generated by the matter of the musician, like a statue 
from bronze, or the opposite would happen. But neither of these two situations occur, nor is 
the musician the opposite of the grammarian. The commentator follows pseudo-Alexander in 
referring to Aristotle’s subsequent explanation in  E 3 on the matter of the reason why 
accidental beings do not give rise to generation and destruction.165 
In the next passage, Aristotle says that we need to describe, as far as possible, the 
nature of the accidental and from what causes it proceeds. Then it will also become clear why 
there is no science of it.166 Pseudo-Alexander writes that Aristotle will now explain why, 
although it is among the not-being things, the accident is nonetheless included among the 
entities.167 This claim is found in pseudo-Philoponus’s commentary too.168 Aristotle now 
distinguishes between beings that are always in the same state and are of necessity (not 
necessity in the sense of compulsion, but because they cannot be otherwise) and those that are 
of necessity nor always, but for the most part. This would be the principle and the cause of 
the existence of the accident: in fact that which is neither always nor for the most part, we 
call accident. Aristotle provides several examples. If in the dog-days there is wintry and cold 
weather, we say this is an accident, but the same cannot be said if it is hot, since this happens 
always or for the most part. It is also an accident that a man is pale, since this happens neither 
always nor for the most part, whereas it is no accident that man is an animal. For a builder to 
produce health is also accidental, because it is the nature not of the builder but of the doctor 
164 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 450, 15-27. 
165 Cf. pseudo-Philoponus, In Metaph., p. 24 v.   
166 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 2, 1026 b 24-27. 
167 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 450, 30-32. 
168 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 24 v.  
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to do this. Then a confectioner may make something wholesome, but not in virtue of the 
confectioner’s art. We can thus say that this happens by accident, and there is a sense in 
which he makes it, but in the unqualified sense it does not.169     
The threefold division of the entities mentioned at the beginning of the passage reflects 
Aristotle’s conception of the relationship between science and reality. Science only concerns 
two kind of entities, i.e. those that are always and of necessity, which are the object of the 
more and the less exact sciences (such as mathematics and physics, respectively). No science 
exists, on the other hand, for entities that are neither always nor for the most part. Asclepius 
identifies the entities that are of necessity with the divine entities (τὰ θεῖα) (since the God is 
good of necessity, not in the sense of compulsion, but because of the divine substance), and 
with man, as an animal. An example of entities that are, not of necessity but for the most part, 
is a man who has five fingers.170 Pseudo-Alexander also uses man as an example of entities 
that are always and of necessity, since he is always and of necessity an animal. Since 
‘necessary’ can also be used to indicate a compulsion, the commentator feels the need to 
specify that Aristotle would say that ‘necessity’ must not be understood here in the sense of 
‘compulsion’: man is an animal always and of necessity, not because he is obliged to be an 
animal, but inasmuch as he is unable to not be an animal. As an example of accidental being, 
pseudo-Alexander mentions man who, for the most part, has five fingers171, which had 
already appeared in Asclepius’s commentary.  The subsequent definition of accident as an 
«interval (διάλειμμα) of ‘for the most part’»172 suggests that an accident is something that 
interrupts the occurrence of what happens always or for the most part.173  
Aristotle goes on to say that, while to other things answer faculties productive of them, 
to accidents there corresponds no determinate art nor faculty, for the causes of things that are 
or come to be by accident are also accidental.174 Asclepius, pseudo-Alexander and pseudo-
Philoponus all explain that Aristotle claims that things that are per se, and that happen for the 
169 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 2, 1026 b 27-1027 a 5. 
170 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 368, 11-18. 
171 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., pp. 451, 4-14 and p. 451, 15, where accident is described as 
«what interrupts the continuity of the ‘for most part’». 
172 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 451, 13-14. 
173 Cf. Cauli, in Movia, Commentario alla “Metafisica”, p. 1186 note 152. 
174 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 2, 1027 a 5-8. According to many scholars the text is corrupt: see Ross, 
Metaph., vol. I, 360-361. 
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most part are produced by the arts - as medicine produces health, for example - while for 
things that are accidentally there is no art or determinate power.175 
In the next passage Aristotle poses as principle of accidental being the fact that not all 
things are or come to be of necessity and always. For instance, for a pale man to be a 
musician does not happen always nor even for the most part, and - since it happens only 
occasionally - it must be accidental. If this were not the case then everything would be of 
necessity.176 Here Aristotle returns to the classification of entities introduced a little earlier 
on177, and he says that most of these entities belong to things that are or that come into being 
for the most part. They are natural entities or occurrences that are governed by laws, and that 
consequently take place regularly. The existence of the accident is made necessary by the 
presence of other beings that do not belong to this class, but are rather classifiable among the 
contingent realities. On this issue, pseudo-Alexander refers to the second section of De 
interpretatione, where “it is demonstrated that not all things are of necessity, but that there is 
also the contingent”.178 The commentator probably means to refer to De interpret. 9, where, 
as we know, Aristotle deals with contingent futures. Asclepius and pseudo-Philoponus 
restrict themselves to following Aristotle’s text.179 
As a consequence of the above-mentioned claim, Aristotle posits that matter must be 
the cause of the accident, since it is capable of being otherwise than as it usually is.180 On this 
passage, Asclepius comments that cause of the accident must be the matter because it can 
receive something different from the way it is for the most part, and he uses Aristotle’s 
example of it being cold weather in dog-day.181 Pseudo-Alexander explains that matter 
possesses a nature such that it may be that men are sometimes born with five fingers, and 
sometimes with four or six.182 Pseudo-Philoponus goes along with pseudo-Alexander’s 
comment.183 Aristotle then says that we need to consider the question of whether there can be 
175 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 368, 32-38; pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 451, 33-38; pseudo-
Philoponus, In Metaph., p. 24 v. 
176 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 2, 1027 a 8-13. 
177 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 2, 1026 b 28-31. 
178 Pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 452, 8-10. 
179 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 369, 4-9; pseudo-Philoponus, In Metaph., pp. 24 v-25 r. 
180 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 2, 1027 a 13-15. 
181 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 369, 10-12; Aristotle, Metaph. E 2, 1026 a 33. 
182 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 452, 10-16. 
183 Cf. pseudo-Philoponus, In Metaph., p. 25 r. 
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anything that is neither always nor for the most part as our starting-point. For there to be only 
what is of necessity or for the most part is impossible, so - besides these - there is what 
happens in some way or other and by accident. For the solution to the question that follows 
immediately, i.e. whether there is only the for the most part, or whether there are also eternal 
beings, the reader is referred elsewhere.184  
The definition of accident as what happens by chance recalls what Aristotle says in 
Phys. II 5, 196 b 10-17, where chance is defined in the same way as accident.185 The 
reference to the solution of the problem of whether eternal beings exist or not concerns the 
demonstration of the existence of unmoved movers, and therefore Metaph. Λ. To explain this 
passage, Asclepius says that it is impossible for nothing to exist that is neither always nor for 
the most part because the evidence suggests that the God is always good, and that the doctor 
heals for the most part. So, if what is for the most part exists, then accidental being exists in 
entities too. The commentator believes that the reference in the conclusion of Aristotle’s 
passage is to the Physics186, where Aristotle would demonstrate the existence of eternal 
matter.187 Pseudo-Alexander identifies the ἀρχή on l. 15 with the «way or rule» to be 
followed in order to demonstrate that accident exists.188 The commentator explains that:  
if somebody wishes to demonstrate that accident exists, he must assume as principle that there is 
something beyond what is always and what is for the most part. If he assume this starting-point, 
whenever he asks his interlocutor whether or not something exists beyond what is always and what is 
for the most part, and the latter, persuaded by the evidence, grants that there is certainly something 
beyond what has been said, this is what can be in some way or other, that is the accident.189 
Going beyond Aristotle’s text, pseudo-Alexander clarifies at the beginning of his 
argumentation that those who intend to demonstrate the existence of accidental must first 
assume as principle that something exists that is not classifiable as being always or for the 
most part. This assumption will enable him to proceed with the demonstration, and will lead 
the interlocutor to admit of the existence of accident on evidence-based grounds. According 
184 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 2, 1027 a 15-19. 
185 Cf. Berti, Métaphysique, p. 158. 
186 Cf. Aristotle, Phys. I 9. 
187 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 370, 14-22.  
188 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 452, 15-16.   
189 pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 452, 17-22: εἰ μέλλοι τις δεικνύναι ὅτι ἔστι τὸ συμβεβηκός, ὡς 
ἀρχὴν λαμβανέτω τὸ εἶναί τι παρὰ τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. τοῦτο δὲ λάβοι ἄν, εἴπερ ἐρωτᾷ τὸν 
προσδιαλεγόμενον, ἆρά γε ἔστι τι παρὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἀεί, ἢ οὔ; ἐκεῖνος δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐναργείας 
πειθόμενος πάντως δώσει τὸ εἶναί τι παρὰ ταῦτα· τοῦτο δέ ἐστι τὸ ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν ἤτοι τὸ 
συμβεβηκός. 
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to pseudo-Alexander, when Aristotle refers the reader elsewhere for the solution of the 
problem of whether eternal entities exist or not, he means Books K and Λ of the Metaphysics, 
in which Aristotle speaks about the problem of eternal entities, in a rather obscure manner in 
the former book, and more thoroughly in the latter.190 Pseudo-Philoponus once again follows 
pseudo-Alexander, and reiterates this last part of the latter’s comment almost word for 
word.191 
In the final part of the chapter, Aristotle says it is obvious that there is no science of the 
accident because all science is either what is always or what is for the most part. Otherwise it 
would be impossible to learn, or to teach another. It must be possible to establish what is the 
object of science as what is always or for the most part. For instance, honey-water is - for the 
most part - useful to a patient in a fever. But it will be impossible to say when this is not the 
case - on the day of new moon, for instance - because what happens on the day of new moon 
also happens either always or for the most part, while accident is outside the always and for 
the most part.192 On line 1027 a 25, in manuscript E we find πότε οὔ, while οὔ is omitted in 
manuscripts J, Ab and  Γ. Asclepius reads πότε οὐκ, and consequently interprets the passage 
in the sense that the benefit of honey-water for the person with a fever does not occur, and 
this prompts the occurrence of what happens neither always nor for the most part; so it 
happens by accident, which cannot be the object of science.193 Pseudo-Alexander, followed 
by pseudo-Philoponus, claims instead that nobody will be capable of teaching (or learning) 
what goes beyond what happens for the most part - what is useful when there is a new moon, 
for instance - because this happens rarely. In fact, it is not that people who drink honey-water 
when there is a new moon will benefit for the most part, but rather that it is for the most part 
useful to those who drink it that it happens to be beneficial when there is a new moon. Vice 
versa, the commentator concludes, what is beneficial when there is a new moon is beneficial 
either always or for the most part. But, because accident goes beyond these situations, there 
190 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 452, 23-27. 
191 Cf. pseudo-Philoponus, In Metaph., p. 25 r: Hoc cum dixit interrogat, utrum id quod ut plurimum 
est in entibus, semper vero et necessario non est, vel ut aeterna, et quae ut plurimum? et respondet 
quod postea considerabit de ipsis in 11. perfecte vero in 12 = pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 452, 
23-27: τοῦτο εἰπὼν ἐρωτᾷ πότερον τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι, τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης 
οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ ἔστιν ἄττα ἀίδια, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ; καὶ ἐρωτήσας ἀποκρίνεται ὅτι περὶ τούτων 
ὕστερον ἔσται ἐπισκέψασθαι· καὶ ἐρεῖ ἐν τῷ Κ μὲν ἀμυδρότερον τῆσδε τῆς πραγματείας, τελείως δὲ 
ἐν τῷ Λ. 
192 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 2, 1027 a 19-26. 
193 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 370, 28-30. 
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can be no science dealing with it.194 The sense of Aristotle’s discourse seems to be that 
accident is distinguishable from what happens always or for the most part (and can be the 
object of science) by the fact, for instance, that honey-water can be beneficial for a person 
with a fever. It is impossible to establish when this might not be the case, such as when there 
is a new moon, because the new moon can also be classified as something that occurs either 
always or for the most part, whereas accident cannot. 
Thus far, we have tried to demonstrate that, according to our commentators, all of 
Aristotle’s discourse about accident focusing on demonstrating that there can be no science 
dealing with it would aim specifically to exclude accident from the object of theological 
science, rather than from the object of the other sciences. By virtue of this, the second and 
subsequent chapters in Book E would be fully consistent with the line of reasoning Aristotle 
develops in the Metaphysics. The conclusive passage in chapter 2, which brings up the 
problem of the cause of accident, must continue in the same direction. In their comments on 
Aristotle’s final claim to have demonstrated what accident is, what causes it, and that there is 
no science dealing with it195, both Asclepius196 and pseudo-Alexander identify matter as the 
cause of accident, based on 1027 a 13-15. The problem of what kind of cause the accident has 
is discussed in chapter 3, where the question is open to new possible solutions. 
 
3. Accident and its cause 
 
The theory that Aristotle intends to demonstrate in E 3 is stated in the incipit: it is 
obvious that there are principles and causes which are generable and destructible without ever 
being in course of being generated or destroyed. The demonstration that follows is a sort of 
reductio ad absurdum: if this were not so, everything would happen necessarily, since what is 
generated or destroyed must have a cause that is not accidental, that is per se.197 
To explain Aristotle’s passage, Asclepius says that accidental causes are generated and 
destroyed qua entities (ὡς ὄντα), not because they are generated things, since these causes are 
not determinate and in a strict sense. On this topic, the commentator gives the example of the 
horse being used in a war that ran away because it was thirsty and, in doing so, it saved its 
194 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., pp. 452, 34-453, 2. 
195 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 2, 1027 a 26-28.  
196 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 371, 3-4; pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 453, 5-6. 
197 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 3, 1027 a 29-32. 
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skin: Asclepius explains that the horse did not run away to stay safe, but because it was 
thirsty.198 What Asclepius seems to be saying is that the causes of accidental being are not 
generated and do not perish in the same way as causes per se, the generation and destruction 
of which are part of a process the purpose of which is their generation and destruction. 
Instead, they come into being and are destroyed fortuitously, so they exist and cease to exist 
inasmuch as they are entities, not inasmuch as they are the result of a process having as its 
object their generation or destruction. Pseudo-Alexander explains that accidental causes are 
and are not without any generation or destruction, like contacts (αἱ ἁφαί), and instants (τὰ 
νῦν).199 He says Aristotle assumes that it is commonly accepted that entities with causes and 
principles that exist as a result of a process of generation are of necessity. So, if entities with 
causes that come into being through generation (such as a house) come to be of necessity, 
then the causes of entities that are not of necessity are and are not without any generation or 
destruction. If this were not so, i.e. if all causes of entities were necessary and per se, then 
everything would be necessarily determinate.200  
Aristotle clarifies the above considerations by posing the question of whether ‘this 
something’ (τοδί) will occur or not. The answer is that it will occur if another thing happens, 
while it would not occur if the latter were not to happen. This affirmations are followed by 
examples of future events. Aristotle says that, if we always subtract time from a limited 
extent of time, we will obviously come to the present: so a given man will die of disease or 
by violence if he leaves his home, and this will happen if he gets thirsty. But this will only 
happen if another event occurs, and in this way we will arrive at the present, or at what has 
already happened. For instance, the man will leave his home if he gets thirsty, and he will get 
thirsty if he is eating salty food. But this will or will not happen, so the man will or will not 
die.201 As an example of the event that might happen, Asclepius returns to the sea-battle that 
Aristotle used in De interpret. 9202. In the manuscripts, on line 1027 a 2, we find νόσῳ ἢ βίᾳ, 
198 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 371, 8-17. Cf. Aristotle, Phys. II 6, 197 b 15-18. 
199 Pseudo-Alexander gives the example of the builder who is per se the cause of the house, who also 
happens to be the cause of the fact that the house produces shade, or that somebody finds it 
unpleasant. The builder has become the cause of this not through generation or learning, but through 
these processes he has become a builder (cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., pp. 453, 11-454, 1). We 
find the same example in pseudo-Philoponus’s commentary (cf. pseudo-Philoponus, In Metaph., p. 25 
r).  
200 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 454, 7-33. 
201 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 3, 1027 a 32-b 6. 
202 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., pp. 372, 35-373, 3.  
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but Ross expunges νόσῳ ἢ because he believes that it derives from line a 10, where the same 
expression appears. Asclepius keeps to the version of the manuscripts and explains that the 
man will die of disease if the harmony between the opposing elements comprising his body is 
disrupted; or he will die by violence if he is assaulted by his enemies because he has left town 
having eaten salty food.203 Pseudo-Alexander dedicates a lengthy exegesis to Aristotle’s 
passage. He gives the man the name of Nicostratus and claims that he will die if he has left 
town and been captured by his enemies during a siege. The commentator explains that the 
cause of his death will be having left town, which is caused by his wishing to drink some 
water; this in turn will have been caused by his getting thirsty, and his thirst has been caused 
by his having eaten salty food. Pseudo-Alexander identifies this last cause as accidental and 
not per se, since it is possible to get thirsty without having eaten salty food - after strenuous 
physical exertion, for instance.204 So it seems that, in the commentator’s view, the cause of 
Nicostratus’s death - having eaten salty food - is accidental inasmuch as his death could have 
been caused by a plurality of fortuitous events. The same explanation of Aristotle’s passage 
can be found in pseudo-Philoponus’s commentary.205  
Pseudo-Alexander considers the possibility of the man dying due to disease in his 
comment on 1027 a 10-11, where the expression νόσῳ ἢ βίᾳ comes up again. He explains 
that the living being is such because opposites (fire and earth) and intermediates have been 
generated therein; and because of the battle that takes place between the opposing elements, a 
man may become ill, and if he has drunk too much water he will become ill with dropsy. 
Drinking too much water will therefore be the cause of his dropsy, and dropsy will be the 
cause of his death, but it will not be a cause per se because people can become ill with dropsy 
even if they have not drunk any water.206 So it would seem that, in pseudo-Alexander’s view, 
an accidental cause would be a cause that slips into a series of causes per se, and triggers the 
occurrence of an event that does not maintain the necessary bond with its cause because it 
could also have been triggered by another, different cause. Asclepius seems to retain the 
necessary bond between the effect and its cause, however. He acknowledges that the cause 
behind the survival of the horse that escaped death in war was its thirst, the effect of which 
was to induce the animal to go looking for water. Aristotle seems to admit of this possibility: 
203 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 373, 5-20. 
204 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., pp. 454, 34-455, 2.  
205 Cf. pseudo-Philoponus, In Metaph., p. 25 r. 
206 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., pp. 455, 38-456, 15. 
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the series of causes he describes is a succession of accidental causes, which become per se to 
the degree in which they give rise to a certain event.   
After explaining the case of future events, Aristotle applies the same approach to past 
events as well. What has happened, he argues, can already be found in something, i.e. in a 
thing of the past, so all future things will then be of necessity, as when the living die, for 
instance, because something has happened, like the presence of opposing elements in the 
same body. What remains indeterminate, however, is whether the living will die of disease or 
by violence, and this depends on the occurrence of a certain situation.207 We find the term 
σώματι after αὐτῷ in b 10 in the manuscripts E and J, but not in Ab or in pseudo-
Alexander.208 Neither of the two cases poses problems in the interpretation of the passage. 
Aristotle claims here that even accidental past events can be brought down to a previous 
accidental cause, which becomes the cause per se of the event that it triggers, since the event 
necessarily depends on it. The presence of opposing elements in the individual is thus the 
cause per se of his death, but whether he died of disease or by violence remains indeterminate 
because this will depend on the occurrence of a certain situation. As we have seen, the 
passage was discussed by Asclepius in his comment on 1027 b 2209, when the expression 
νόσῳ ἢ βίᾳ first occurs, while pseudo-Alexander explains it more coherently in his comment 
on this section of Aristotle’s text. Pseudo-Philoponus keeps close to Aristotle’s words.210   
Aristotle goes on to say it is evident that we can go back to a certain starting-point that 
it will be impossible to bring down to another: this will be the starting-point of what happens 
by chance, and there will be no other cause of its coming to be.211 The accidental cause is 
therefore presented here as a principle that, as such, cannot be brought down to any other 
cause. The term ἄλλο in 1027 b 13 is omitted from the manuscripts Ε, J, Γ, and also in 
Asclepius212, because there is really no cause of the principle, but the term appears in Ab, and 
in pseudo-Alexander.213 Asclepius identifies the principle in question with eating salty food, 
and thus with the accidental cause of a violent death. He specifies that this principle can also 
happen in another way, and there is no determinate cause of its coming to be, since this is 
207 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 3, 1027 b 6-11.  
208 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 456, 4. 
209 Cf. supra, note 203. 
210 Cf. pseudo-Philoponus, In Metaph., p. 25 r. 
211 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 3, 1027 b 12-14. 
212 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 373, 15. 
213 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 456, 17.  
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impossible. Asclepius also mentions the battle of the elements that have produced the disease 
as an accidental cause, showing that - alongside accidental causes consisting of human 
decisions - he also considers accidental causes consisting of natural facts.214 Pseudo-
Alexander (followed by pseudo-Philoponus215) identifies the accidental cause with having 
eaten salty food, and he describes it as the principle of what can happen in different ways, i.e. 
of the fact that the individual has died.216 Among the modern interpreters, Sorabji mentions 
the name of Nicostratus in his comment on Aristotle’s passage, and he suggests that the 
accidental cause of the Nicostratus’s death, i.e. the encounter with his enemies, does not in 
turn have any cause. This would happen as a result of the combination of two series of 
independent causes, i.e. Nicostratus’s departure from the town and the presence of the enemy, 
and so it would be the fact that these two events occurred simultaneously that would remain 
without cause.217 Aristotle could be referring, however, to a single accidental cause (having 
eaten salty food), which slips into the chain of causes per se and produces an accidental 
event. 
The chapter ends with Aristotle saying that the question of what sort of starting-point and 
what sort of cause we refer the accidental causes - whether to matter of to the purpose or to 
the motive power - needs to be carefully examined.218 This might mean that we need to see to 
what genus of cause we must refer the accidental cause by considering every case in its 
particular aspects. In addition to the possible types of causes suggested by Aristotle, 
Asclepius also suggests the formal cause as he believes (like pseudo-Alexander219 and 
pseudo-Philoponus220) that the accidental cause should be refer to the efficient cause.221 
Sorabji wonders how the determinism that he attributes to Aristotle, and that would emerge in 
Metaph. E 3, can be reconciled with what Aristotle would claim in the Ethics.222 In actual 
214 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 373, 13-20.  
215 Cf. pseudo-Philoponus, In Metaph., p. 25 r. 
216 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 456, 16-22. 
217 Cf. Richard Sorabji, Necessity, Cause, and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle’s Theory (London, 
Durckwort 1980), pp. 10-13.  
218 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 3, 1027 b 14-16. 
219 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 456, 22-25. 
220 Cf. pseudo-Philoponus, In Metaph., p. 25 r. 
221 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 373, 22-26. 
222 Sorabji, Necessity, Cause, and Blame, pp. 251-256. The theory has been criticised by many 
interpreters, including Gail Fine, Aristotle on Determinism: A Review of Richard Sorabji’s Necessity, 
Cause and Blame, «The Philosophical Review», 90 (1981), pp. 561-579. 
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fact, from Metaph. E 3 there is nothing to suggest that Aristotle had taken a deterministic 
stance: admitting the existence of accidental causes leaves room for freedom and for human 
choice.223  
 
4. Being as truth and not-being as falsity  
 
After dealing with accidental being, Aristotle says we now need to concern ourselves 
with being as truth and not-being as falsity, which respectively depend on combination and 
separation. The set of both together depends on the allocation of a pair of contradictory 
judgements: in fact, truth is the affirmation of what is really combined, and the negation of 
what is really separated, whereas falsity has the opposite of this allocation.224   
Being as truth and not-being as falsity had been mentioned as a second meaning of 
being in the incipit of Metaph. E 2, and as a third meaning of being in Metaph. Δ 7. Here, 
Aristotle explains that ‘being’ and ‘is’ mean that a statement is true; e.g. «Socrates is 
musical» means that this is true. He says that ‘not-being’ mean that a statement is not true but 
false, as when we say that «the diagonal of the square is not commensurate with the side», 
since this is false.225 The term ἐπειδή on line 1027 b 19 introduces the protasis of a 
proposition with no apodosis, as already happened in the incipit of chapter 2. Bonitz and 
Jaeger make the apodosis begin on line 1027 b 28, while Ross would have it begin on line b 
33. Asclepius explains Aristotle’s passage by saying that not-being qua falsity denotes non-
existent things, like the hircocervus, since things that do not exist are said to be false. That 
true and false have to do with combination and separation, and that they concern the 
allocation of a pair of contradictory judgements means, according to Asclepius, that an 
affirmation is true when we place together things having the same nature, which is contrary to 
the false affirmation; the situation is much the same for negation.226 In 1027 b 19 Asclepius 
reads περί, while in pseudo-Alexander and manuscripts Ε, J, Ab and Γ we find παρά. Pseudo-
Alexander explains Aristotle’s passage by saying that ‘being’ and ‘not-being’ concern 
223 I supported this idea in Rita Salis, The Accident and its Causes: Pseudo-Alexander on Aristotle 
(Metaphysics Ε 3), in Konstantinos Boudouris (ed.), Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of 
Philosophy (Athens, 4-10 August 2013), (Charlottesville, Virginia 2018, Philosophy Documentation 
Center, vol. 2, section II), pp. 297-302. 
224 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 4, 1027 b 17-23.  
225 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. Δ 7, 1017 a 31-35.  
226 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., pp. 373, 28-374, 1. 
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combination and separation inasmuch as truth is said ‘being’, and falsity is said ‘not-being’. 
The commentator gives the example of the phrase «Socrates is seated», and explains that this 
is said to be true when the property of being seated belongs to Socrates and we associate it 
with him. If instead, when Socrates is seated, we say that he is not seated, since this is false, it 
is said ‘not-being’ inasmuch as it has been erroneously divided. The commentator goes on to 
say that falsity introduces the allocation of a pair of contradictory judgements, i.e. it 
constitutes the other part of the contradiction: while being as truth occurs when the predicate 
is connected with truth with the subject, not-being as falsity is the opposite.227 This last part 
of pseudo-Alexander’s comment is echoed in the words of pseudo-Philoponus.228    
Then Aristotle declares that the question of the way in which it happens that we think 
simultaneously (ἅμα) or separately (χωρίς) so that, instead of a succession, something 
connected is produced, is the object of another discourse.229 Asclepius places νοεῖν before τὸ 
ἅμα on line 1027 b 33, and says that this thought does not consist of a series of objects, such 
as man, horse, dog, inasmuch as each of these is neither true nor false. Instead, we need to 
say «man is an animal» if we are dealing with an affirmation, or «man is not an animal» if we 
are dealing with a negation230. Pseudo-Alexander, followed by pseudo-Philoponus231, refers 
to Metaph. Z as the place where Aristotle is concerned with this issue, and he give an 
example of things that can be thought together although they are said separately, such as 
«animal, terrestrial and biped». As an example of the thought of things that form a 
succession, and that must be excluded, the commentator mentions the Iliad, which consists of 
a series of books.232 
Aristotle says that, as a consequence of the above considerations, truth and falsity are 
not in things, as if good were true and bad were in itself false, but rather in thought (ἐν 
διανοίᾳ). Truth and falsity therefore should not be confused with the combination and 
separation of things, since - were that to happen - good would immediately be true and bad 
would immediately be false. As for simple concepts and essences, falsity and truth do not 
exist even in thought - but for the discussion on that which is or is not in this sense the reader 
227 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., pp. 456, 30-457, 10. 
228 Cf. pseudo-Philoponus, In Metaph., p. 25 r. 
229 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 4, 1027 b 23-25. 
230 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 374, 1-4.  
231 Cf. pseudo-Philoponus, In Metaph., p. 25 r. 
232 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 457, 10-19.  
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is referred elsewhere.233 Asclepius interprets the claim that truth and falsity are not in things 
as meaning that they are in discourses (ἐν τοῖς λόγοις), i.e. in propositions, and as an example 
he uses the phrase «true is good, while false is bad».234 The terms are reversed here, as 
Aristotle says that «good is true» and that «bad is false» to rule out the theory in opposition to 
his own.235 Pseudo-Alexander comments on the passage by saying that being as truth and not-
being as falsity concern the combination and separation, since falsity and truth are not found 
in things. In fact, if truth and falsity were not an affection of our thought, and did not concern 
combination and separation, but were in things, then by saying ‘good’ we would also be 
saying ‘true’, and good would be true, just as by saying ‘bad’ we would be saying ‘false’. The 
commentator explains that simple things are «intelligible entities per se, without combination 
and separation».236 Pseudo-Alexander must therefore read the term εὐθύς, which is not in the 
manuscripts E and J, but appears in the manuscript Ab.237 The commentator thus interprets 
Aristotle’s passage in the sense that truth and falsity are not in things, since - if they were - 
good would refer directly to truth and bad to falsity, a theory that Aristotle rules out.  
This last time the reader is referred elsewhere, it is to Metaph. Θ 10, if we accept that 
the reference to the sense of being is to being as truth and not-being as falsity, as pseudo-
Alexander suggests238. This raises the problem of how to reconcile the reference with what 
Aristotle says in b 33-34, i.e. that we need to leave aside accidental being and being as truth. 
Asclepius avoids the contradiction by replacing the expression in 1027 b 29: «that which is in 
this sense» (τὸ οὕτως ὂν) with «that which is really» (τὸ ὄντως ὂν), which he identifies with 
being per se.239 This interpretation would mean that the reference is to the figures of 
predication, which is discussed in Metaph. Z and H. It has been suggested that this might be 
an erroneous reference in the manuscript used by Asclepius.240 Be that as it may, the 
233 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 4, 1027 b 25-29. Jaeger believed that lines 1027 b 25-29 were a later 
addition of the same period as Metaph. Θ (cf. Werner Jaeger, Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der 
Metaphysik des Aristoteles (Berlin, Weidmann 1912), pp. 21-28; Werner Jaeger, Aristoteles. 
Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung (Berlin, Weidmann 1923), p. 212; Werner Jaeger, 
Aristotelis Metaphysica, recognovit brevique adnotatione critiqua instruxit Werner Jaeger (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press 1992), in app. cr.). 
234 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 374, 5-6.  
235 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 4, 1027 b 26-27.  
236 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 457, 20-36.  
237 So also pseudo-Philoponus, In Metaph., p. 25 r. 
238 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., pp. 457, 39-458, 1. 
239 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 374, 9. 
240 Cf. Berti, Métaphysique, p. 194. 
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reference contained in Asclepius certainly responds better to the problem of how to place 
Book E in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, given that it acknowledges a connection with the books 
that follow in relation to the core topic of the work: first philosophy. 
In the final part of Book Ε, Aristotle says that since the combination and the separation 
are in thought and not in things, and «that which is in this sense» is a different sort of ‘being’ 
from the things that are in the full sense (in fact, thought unites or separates either the 
subject’s essence, or its having a quality or quantity or something else), accidental being and 
being as true must be dismissed.241 Aristotle seems to return on line 1027 b 29 to the 
discourse begun on line b 19, and to provide the solution. After reminding us that 
combination and separation, i.e. affirmation and negation, are in thought, where they give rise 
to truth and falsity - and therefore being as truth is also in thought - Aristotle concludes that 
being as truth («that which is in this sense») differs from «from the things that are in the full 
sense». The latter expression must refer to being according to the different the figures of 
predication, and to being potentially and actually, i.e. the two principal meanings of being. 
To explain this passage Asclepius says that thought unites or separates, uniting the 
substance with the quantity, the quality, and the other categories, as when we say, for 
instance, that Achilles is five cubits tall (quantity), or that he is white (quality), or that he is a 
father (relationship).242 Pseudo-Alexander identifies the principal senses of being with 
individual substances, i.e. with the intelligible that Aristotle discusses in the next book 
(probably thinking of forms, which are the object of Metaph. Z). The commentator replaces 
the term «separates» (ἀφαιρεῖ)  on line 1027 b 33 with «divides» (διαιρεῖ), and explains that 
thought unites and divides (διαιρεῖ) substance with substance, or substance with quality or 
quantity.243 Pseudo-Philoponus’s comment on this point is rather important because he refers 
to the interpretation of pseudo-Alexander, attributing it to «the man from Ephesus»244 -  an 
important clue supporting the theory that identifies pseudo-Alexander with Michael of 
Ephesus.245  
Aristotle’s conclusion that accidental being and being as truth must be dismissed 
implies that they do not have to be part of the science of being qua being. This is because the 
241 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 4, 1027 b 29-34.  
242 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 374, 10-17.  
243 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 458, 1-9. 
244 Cf. supra, § 0. 
245 Cf. Moraux, Alexandre d’Aphrodise, p. 15; Moraux, Alexander von Aphrodisias, p. 423;  Tarán, 
Syrianus and pseudo-Alexander’s commentary,  pp. 215-216; Luna, Trois études, p. 5. 
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cause of the former is indeterminate, and that of the latter is an affection of the thought; both 
are related on the remaining genus of being, and they do not manifest any separate class of 
being.246 To our commentators, this statement must have sounded like further confirmation of 
the role of Book E in the whole picture of the Metaphysics: here, Aristotle’s aim would be to 
demonstrate which meanings of being should be the object of first philosophy, and which 
meanings should remain outside its field of investigation. It is therefore the Aristotelian text 
itself that gives the commentators the starting-point for their particular interpretation of the 
whole of Aristotle’s work. Asclepius thus believes that the «remaining genus of being» is 
being per se247, and both pseudo-Alexander and pseudo-Philoponus also think that the 
remaining genus of being is being intended in the full sense.248 The expression «they do not 
manifest any separate class of being» is interpreted by Asclepius as meaning that accidental 
being and being as truth revolve (στρέφονται) around it249, while pseudo-Alexander suggests 
that it means that these meanings of being «do not manifest any class of being that is separate 
and goes beyond being».250 The expression might refer to what was claimed a little earlier, 
i.e. that since the cause of accidental being is indeterminate, and since being as truth is an 
affection of the thought, they must be excluded from the investigation.251 The nature of these 
two ways of being would be subordinate and dependent on being per se, i.e. on the remaining 
meaning of being, and they would not refer to any concrete reality outside the same meaning 
of being. 
Book E concludes with the claim that we need to dismiss these meanings of being and 
focus instead on the causes and principles of being itself. Then, returning to what he said in 
Metaph. Z, Aristotle declares that it is evident that ‘being’ has numerous meanings.252 
Scholars have paid particular attention to the expression τοῦ ὄντος αὐτοῦ in 1028 a 3. The 
translation as «Being-itself» would seem to make what Aristotle says here contradict what he 
says in Metaph. Β 4, 1001 a 23, 27 and 30, where the same expression is attributed to the 
Pythagoreans and to Plato, who respectively admitted of the existence of the Being whose 
essence consisted of Being-itself, and of the One, whose essence was the One-itself. This 
246 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 4, 1027 b 34-1028 a 2. 
247 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 374, 19-20. 
248 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 458, 17; pseudo-Philoponus, In Metaph., p. 25 r. 
249 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 374, 20-21. 
250 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 458, 18-19. 
251 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 4, 1027 b 33-1028 a 1. 
252 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. E 4, 1028 a 3-6.  
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doctrine was criticized by Aristotle, however, because it would have meant falling into 
Parmenides’s monism, the doctrine according to which everything can be brought down to a 
single being or, in other words, to Being-itself. The theory of being having its essence in 
Being-itself was taken up again in ancient and mediaeval Platonism and, on the strength of 
the passage in the Exodus253, where God says to Moses: “I Am Who I Am”, the being 
intended in this case was identified with the Christian God. The translation of the expression 
τοῦ ὄντος αὐτοῦ as «Being-itself», which appears to be the only feasible one, does not 
necessarily imply that Aristotle contradicts what he said in Metaph. Β. The phrase should 
therefore be intended not in the technical sense used by Plato and the Platonists, but more 
simply as referring to being qua being: the adjective αὐτός appears to indicate that the object 
of the investigation will specifically concern being qua being. The final passage on lines 5-6 
(ὅτι πολλαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ὄν) appears in the manuscripts Ε, J and Γ, and not in Ab, but it 
reappears in the opening words of Book Z.  After ὄν, the manuscripts Ε, J and Γ also add: 
σημαίνει γὰρ τὸ τί ἐστιν. It may be that these words were added by an editor coming after 
Andronicus to lend unity to the content of the Metaphysics. Book E would thus be better 
connected to Book Δ, where the different meanings of being are expounded in chapter 7, and 
with Book Z, where the closing words of Book E are repeated in the incipit. In commenting 
on the last part of Book E, Asclepius repeats that we need to examine the causes of being that 
is in the full sense, i.e. of being per se, since the other causes are investigated therein.254 
Pseudo-Alexander likewise explains that, since accidental being and being as truth depend on 
being, and since the investigation focuses on the causes of being qua being, it will also 
concern these other senses of being, and there will be no need for an investigation dedicated 
specifically to the latter.255 Pseudo-Philoponus and Asclepius ignore the concluding passage, 
but Hayduck - the author of the critical edition of Asclepius’s commentary - believe that it 
253 Cf. Ex., 3, 14. 
254 Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph., p. 374, 21-23. 
255 Cf. pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph., p. 458, 17-21. 
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could be necessary to make an addition to the text. Pseudo-Alexander, on the other hand, 
makes a reference to the passage, albeit without commenting on it.256 
The comments on the last section of Book E provide another important element for 
clarifying the way in which the ancient commentators justified the role of Book E within the 
framework of the Metaphysics. In the text containing Aristotle’s division of the sciences and 
his awarding of the primacy to theological science, the aim of his treatment of the other 
meanings of being would have been to emphasize that the investigation conducted in the 
Metaphysics should properly concern being per se, and to demonstrate that the other 
meanings of being preserve some sort of link with the principal meaning, i.e. being per se. 
This served as a further important justification for the unity of the whole of the Metaphysics. 
 
 
 Rita Salis 





Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis Metaphysica commentaria, edidit Hermann Bonitz (Berolini, 
Reimer 1847). 
Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis Metaphysica commentaria (CAG 1), edidit M. Hayduck 
(Berolini, Reimer 1891). 
Alexandri Aphrodisei Commentaria In duodecim Aristotelis libros de prima Philosophia, interprete 
Ioannes Genesius Sepulveda (Pariis 1536). 
Alexandru, Stefan, A New Manuscript of Pseudo-Philoponus’ Commentary on Aristotle’s 
‘Metaphysics’ Containg a Hitrherto Unknown Ascription of the Work, «Phronesis»,  44 (1999), pp. 
347-352. 
Aristote, La Metaphysique, nouvelle éd. entièrement refondue avec commentaire par Jules Tricot, 2 
voll. (Paris, Vrin 1962). 





Journal of Ancient Philosophy 
ISSN 1981-9471 - FFLCH/USP 
www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga
J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.12, n.1. p. 89-132, 2018. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v12i2p89-132 
130
Aristoteles, Metaphysik, übersetzt Hermann Bonitz, neu bearbeitet, mit Einleitung und Kommentar 
hrsg. v. Horst Seidl, griechischer Text in der Edition von Wilhelm Christ, 2 Bde. (Hamburg, Meiner 
1978/1980). 
Aristotelis Metaphysica, recognovit brevique adnotatione critiqua instruxit Werner Jaeger, (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press 1992). 
Aristotelis Opera, ex recensione Immanuelis Bekkeri, edidit Academia Regia Borussica, 2. ed., 
accedunt fragmenta, scholia, Index Aristotelicus/addendis instruxit fragmentorum collectionem 
retractavit O. Gigon, voll. I-II (De Gruyter, Berolini, 1960). 
Asclepii in Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libros Α-Ζ commentaria (CAG 6.2), edidit M. Hayduck 
(Berolini, Reimer  1888). 
Berti, Enrico, Aristote. Métaphysique Livre Epsilon, Introduction, traduction et commentaire (Paris, 
Vrin 2015). 
Brandis, Christian August, Scholia in Aristotelem, in Aristotelis Opera, edidit Academia Regia 
Borussica, vol. IV (Berolini 1836). 
Cauli, Norma, Commento al libro Ε (sesto). Presentazione, traduzione e note, in Giancarlo Movia 
(ed.), Alessandro di Afrodisia e pseudo-Alessandro, Commentario alla “Metafisica” di Aristotele, 
(Milano, Bompiani 2007), pp. 1129-1191. 
Ebbesen, Sten, Commentators and Commentaires on Aristotle’s Sophistici Elenchi: A Study of Post-
Aristotelian Ancient and Medieval Writings on Fallacies, vol. III, Appendix 8 (Leiden, Brill 1981). 
Fine, Gail, Aristotle on Determinism: A Review of Richard Sorabji’s Necessity, Cause and Blame, 
«The Philosophical Review», 90 (1981), pp. 561-579. 
Freudenthal, Jacob, Die durch Averroes erhaltenen Fragmente Alexanders zur Metaphysik des 
Aristoteles untersucht und übersetzt, «Abhandlungen der königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften 
zu Berlin», phil. hist. Kl., no. 1, Berlin 1884. 
Heath, Thomas Little, The Thirteen Books of Euclid’s Elements with Introduction and Commentary, 
vol. I (New York, Dover 19562). 
Jaeger, Werner, Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles (Berlin, Weidmann 
1912). 
 Jaeger, Werner, Aristoteles. Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung (Berlin, Weidmann 
1923). 
Kirwan, Christopher, Aristotle, Metaphysics Books Gamma, Delta, and Epsilon, transl. with notes 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press 1971, 19932 , repr. 1998). 
Kremer, Klaus, Der Metaphysikbegriff in den Aristoteles-Kommentaren der Ammonius-Schule 
(Münster, Aschendorff 1961). 
Little Heath, Thomas, The Thirteen Books of Euclid’s Elements with Introduction and Commentary, 
vol. I (New York, Dover 19562). 
Luna, Concetta, Trois études sur la tradition des commentaires anciens à la Métaphysique d’Aristote 
(Leiden-Boston-Köln, Brill 2001). 
Mignucci, Mario, L’argomentazione dimostrativa in Aristotele. Commento agli Analitici secondi, vol. 
I (Padova, Antenore 1975). 
Moraux, Paul, Alexandre d’Aphrodise, exégéte de la Noetique d’Aristote (Liège, Faculté de 
philosophie et lettres and Paris, Droz 1942). 
Moraux, Paul, Aristoteles Werk und Wirkung, Bd. 2: Kommentierung, Überlieferung, Nachleben 
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